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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

:many have said that the headlonc pursuit of pleasure is an
outstanding characteristic of our aGe.

Surely the comrnercial

advertisements we are forced to look at and listen to seem to
bear out this contention:

"For your greater smoking pleasure;"

"Therets more pure pleasure in every drop;" "Have yourself a
pleasure-treat."

And toastmasters at important functions have

been saying "I take great pleasure in presentinG • •• " for years.
Pl~asure

is a word we use frequently, yet I1l0st of the tiL1e we do

not advert to its meaning.

INhat i s

pleastu~e?

question to be answered in this otudy.

That is the

pl~ima.ry

The clear presentation of

st. Thomas Aquinas' a answer to this question is the ultimate E:;oal
of this thesis.
That there is c:enuine need for such a study has become apparent in the search for secondary sources.

So far as can be

learned, no really adequate study and prosentation of st. Thomas's
doctrine on pleasure exists in any lanGuage,

~~d

practically no-

thing at all has been written in English.
As was said above, the most important question to be asked
and answered is, "What is pleasure accordinG to st. Thomas'? tt
1

This

2

will involve an investigation of the location of pleasure among
the categories, of its causes, requisite conditions and effects.
As the thesis title indicates, only the metaphysical and psychological aspects of pleasure will be treated; the moral aspect will
be excluded frol':l consideration.
Briefly, the procedure will be to locate, collate, and expound st. Thomas's teaching on pleasure.

The location phase is

larsely taken care of by the fact that there are three extended
treatments of pleasure, each in a major worl{ and each in a different context.

The Comm.entarz £!! the Sentences treats pleasure in a

discussion of beatitude; the

~wruna

Theolosia! takes it up in a

discussion of the passions; the Comrllenta:r:z 2!!
with it in an ethical context.

~he

Ethics deals

There is also a briefer but still

important passage on pleasure in the Q£ Y,eri tate that wi 11 come
under consideration.

These four tn.ajor works of St. Thomas with

their treatment of pleasure will be the primary sources for this
thesis.

Of course, incidental statements ma.de about pleasure in

these and other works will be talcen into account and will be found
through the standard Thomistio repertories.
In locating secondary sources, all the standaI'd referenoe

orks for Thomistio studies have been used, including those bibliographies published in the leading periodicals.
books and articles is selective.

The final list of

The passing referenoes to pleas-

ure made in Scholastic manuals and textbooks of general psychology
are too geneI'al to be of much help.

Much has been wri ttan on the

3
morality of pleasure, of course, but these disoussions touch the
matter of this thesis only indiI'ectly.
Since this is mainly an exegetical study of St. Thomas, tho
number and quality of the secondary sources is not of primary importance.

They will be used only in an auxiliary manner to clari-

fy, su.rnmarize and chock or substantiate the interpretation of St.
Tho:nas presented in this study.
In planning this thesis, a key problem prosented itself in
the very beginning.

Should the Thomistic dootrine on pleasure be

presented systematioally or chronologically?

The following con-

siderations have led to the adoption of the chronological method.
F'irst, the four major \'COrks cited as primary sources cover a
span of about fifteen years in the life of St. Thomas.
sents a

sple~jid

This pre-

opportunity to note development and refinement

of dootrine during this period of time, if there be any.
Seoond, investigation has shown that some dovelopment of doctrine has taken plaoe.

Taking eaoh work in its proper sequence

seems to be the bost way to point up this development, for the
extensive collation of the systenatio approaoh would lead to considerable overlapping and wearisome backtracking.
reason, the ohr'onoloFioal method is also better

fOI"

For tile same
olarity and

ease of presentation and cOlnprehension.
Wi th the ohronolo:"'"ical approach dec:tded upon, the

corl.~ect

sequence of the four primary sources must be established by determining thoir dates of oomposition.

This is not an easy task by

4
any means, and laadinc scholars on the ch.ronology of st. Thomas's
works are not in full accord.

To avoid being long and burdensome,

we will merely present the conclusions of the latest and best
studies by leading scholars toeether with the references and allow
the reador to investir;ate the question of chronology further if
he wishes.
It seo:ns that the earliest of the four primary sources used
in this thesis is the q,ommentary; .2!!

.E:-~e

Sent.ence!l.

The commonly

accepted date of conpos! tion is 1254-56, with the fOUl~th book possibly runninG oval." into 1257.

Grabmann montions the possibility

of a second redaction about ten years la.ter, but this is still a
hypothesis which lacks conclusive proof. l
The date of' the De Veri tate is very little d:tsputed by scholars.

'Jlhe corn.,llonly accepted date is 1256-59.

The rea.son for the

four-year spread in the date of composition is not hard to find.
The

Qua~stlones

Disputatae

~ V~ritate

are a series of class dis-

cussions or disputations held by St. Thomas while he was teaching
at the Unlveraity of Paris.

They were held frequently for a period

of years indioated by the spread 1256-59.

Since tile section from

this wOl"lc of interest to us occurs quite near the end, we can
assume that it was written by St. Thomas in 1258 or 1259, appro ximately two years after he completed tho C,orrll'nentarz

£g ~

Senton-

5
Turning now to the Comtnentacr .2!! the Nicomachean Ethics, we
find very great disagreement among scholars.

Dates of composition

varying from 1259 to 1271 have been given, aooepted by some, rejected by others and the discussion continues unabatod.

The date

given by Mandop..net,2 1266, stood unchallenged for oone years.

But

within the last decade discussions based on internal evidence have
appeared.

In an article published in 19LJ.9, Gerard Verbeke assigns

the date of 1260 to the oomposi tion of this oomrl1entary.3
his

jud~~ent

He bases

on a careful analYSis of the dootrine of the essenoe

of beatitude and or the role accorded to pleasure in mants beatitude in this commentary and in othor important works of st. Thomas
whose dates are fairly well established.
H.-A. Gauthier,

a.p.,

published an article in

1951 giving the

years 1270 or 1271 as the date of the composition of the Commentary 2n

!h!

Nicomach~

I

Ethios.4

His judgment is based on the

evolution of the doctrine on the virtue of magnanimity and its
opposed vioes.

In an artiole published in 1952, TiTansion disousses

the work of Verbeke and Gauthier but a1?,roes with neither.

He

2p. r,Jiandonnet and J. Dastrez, Bibliop:raEhie Thol';1.i.ste, Vol. I
of Dibllothegue !hom~st~ (Kain, 192~, p. r3.
30lh"ard Verbeke ttLa date du cOl'n.:nontalre de S. Thor.UlS sur 11
Ethique 4 Hicomaquo, r, Hovue Philoso2hiq~e de Lo.uv:~, XLVII {191t9},
203-220.

4n. -A. Ga~thler, o. P. ~ "La date du Commentaire do Saint '.Phomas
sur ~'Ethique a Nicol~aque! Reohercl~e~ ~ theologie ancionno at
medio'!,ale, XVIII (1951), 06-1:05.

6
maintains that the terminus !; quC! of the commentary 1s after the
~

Prima.

of the

S1lmil'lf!

!,heolof:iae and that the terminqs ..!1

is around the time of the Prita.~ Secundae. 5

qU~I!!

This would place it

between the years 1266 and 1268 if we accept Grabmannts dates for
these two parts of the

S'Ilml.;:a

'rheolop:iae.:,)"

Grabrnann, ac;Peeing with

Verbeke, gives 1260 as the date of the Ethic~, but mentions that
Walz favors 1269. 7
With such wi. de divergences among the authorities, it is extremely difficult to assign a definite date for the composition of
this commentary.

Fortunately, an approximate date will suffice

for our purposes here, for if we can place it after the Q!
~

and before the

Pr!m~

Secu..'1dae it will have a defin! te place

in the chronological sequence of' the four primary sources.
the earliest date for tho composition of the Comnlcntarl .2!!
Ethic~,

~

given by any authority is 1260.

How

2

This places it at least

one year after the completion of the De VeritB:te.

PlaCing the

Ethics before the Pri,mf.! Secundae, however, is not quite so simple.
The date of the Prima Secundae is given as 1266-68 by Grabmann8
r::

/A. Mansion, "Autour de In. date du COl1lmentaire de Saint Thomas

a

sur ltEthique
Nlcomaque," Revue Phi1osophl9.uo de Louvaln, L
(1952), 460-471.
._...
. .. -

6arabmann, ~ Werke, 294-301.

7Ib1d., 284.
8 Ib1d ., 294-301.

Glorleux gives 1269-70 for the composition
Secundae. See "Pour la chronlogio de 1a Somme,"
1';!61an~s ~ ~c!once religieuse, I I (l9I~5), 59-98.

of

the~ma

7
and 1269-70 by Mandonnet. 9

Both these datos are before Gauthier's

date for the Ethics and coincide with Walz's date.
of current opinion places the

But tho weight

considerably earlier, any-

Ethic~

where from 1260 (Verbeke and Grabmann) to 1266 (Mandonnet and Mansion).

Therefore it seems best to side w.1th the weight of author-

ity and place the

~thics

before the Prima Seoundae.

The four primary sources, then, fall into the following
chronological sequence: Commentarz £e

~ Senten~es,

Commentarl 2.!! the Nicomaehean Ethics, and the
the Sum.rna Theologiae.
body of the thesis.

Prl~a

~

Veritate,

Secundae of

They wi.. 11 be taken up in this order in the
As eaoh work: comes under consideration, a morE

or less detailed discussion of the loci and context of the passages to be studied will be given.

This is imperative for a clear

understanding of tho doctrine.
Before undertaking the study of St. Thomas himself, it will
be well to follow his exanlple in briefly reviewing the opinions of
Plato and Aristotle on pleasure.

For Thomas rarely speaks of

pleasure at any length without mentioning the position of one or
both of these men, and he frequently uses their definitions as a
starting point for his own discussion. lO
Plato's doctrine on pleasure is not easy to formulate, for he
more often speaks of the place of pleasure in the ethical life of

9Mandonnet, Bibliographie !homiste" p. 13.
10Examples of this are
31, 1.

1a

IV Sent." 49, 3, 1, and ~.!., I-II,

8
man than of its nature.

But in the ninth book of the -,;,..;;,;;;;;.;:;;..;;;..;;,.
Reoublic he

speaks ot it as x{\lT)a'~J "movement,"ll and in the Ehilebus as
ye\lta,~, "becoming, generation. tt12 The latter work oontains the
lnore oomplete development and Is the one usually quoted from by
Aristotle and St. Thomas.

Therefore the thilebus wl11 be the ma.jor

source for the following brief outline of the Platonio doctrine on
pleasure.
As an aid in determining the places of pleasure and knowledge
in the good for man, Plato sets up a fourfold olassifioation of all
things. 13

Anything Which is actual can be placed in one of the

following four classes: the ~nfinite or Wlbounded (~O a~£tpo\l);
limi~;

the mixture or combination of both infinite and limit; and

the oause or principle whioh brings them together.

Pleasure and

pain belong to the infinite, since neither, in its own nature, has
a minimum or maximum.

But they depend on their anteoedents for

measure and proportion, and participate in the harmony of their
causes.
The subject of pleasure and pain, or that in which they arIse,
is always a living, sentient being.

;"Yhen the proper balanoe be-

tween the constituents of an organism 1s disturbed, pain 1s felt;
and when it is restored after being disturbed, pleasure is felt.

llp~ato, The Jtepublio, ,583e, ~ J2.ia.loeue~ of Pla~.£, trans. B.
Jowett, 4th ed:-tOxford, 1953), II, 450.
12plato, Philebus, 53c, The Dialofues of Plato, trans. B.
Jowett, 2nd ad. (6xford, 187~rV, 10 • - -

13 Ibid •• 230-e. 63-6u.

9
In other words, disturbanoe of organio equilibrium is attended by
pain, restoration of the equilibrium by pleasUl'e. 1 4 But this is
only one kind of pleasure.

r:f.lhere is a seoond kind whioh depends on

mental prooesses, and is not acoompanied by either disturbanoe or
reoovery of balanoe in the organism.

Simple examples are the im-

agination of something pleasant or the memory of a painful experienoe, whioh induce pleasure and pain respectively.
There is also a state which is neutral in respect to pleasure
and pain.

This is the life of thourht and oontemplation led by the

man of wisdom, a life of permanent maintenanoe of equilibrium.
This is probably the most godlike of all lives.

It is most nearly

approached in the aesthetic contemplation of pure colors, pure
mathematical forms, and, generally speaking, the pleasures of
learning and knowledge which are not oonditioned by some precedent
pain.

Suoh pleasures are more pure and more real than the pleas-

ures that aooompany the restoration of organio equilibrium.
It seems to be Plato's mind that all pleasures, even those due
to mental activity, involve some yeveo& "
not fully real.

"beooming," and henoe are

He seems to say that pleasure is an acoompaniment

of transitions and developments, ,ulv6~evovJ dAA' odx

ov. 1b

It 18

experienoed while the transition is going on, but oeases when the
definite and permanent end of the transition is reached.

This

no~

14Ibid., 31d-e, P. 73. See Albort Lafontaine, La Plaislr
d'apres-priton et Aristote (Paris, 1902), pp. 51-$2,-Where a simitar tl'eatment ofpleasure in the Timaeus is outlined.

-

15Plato, Republic, IX, 584a, p. 1+57; P,hilebus, 1.i-2c, p. 87.

10
tion seems to arise from a natural extension of the disturbanoerestoration theory to oover all oasss of pleasure.

On this theory,

the good, healthy, or normal state is, of course, that of balanoe
or equilibrium.

Pain and pleasure are both felt only when there is

a departure from this ideal oondition-pain while the prooess of
depletion is going on, pleasure while that of repletion or restoration of the balance is happening.

The natural end or goal of this

"repletion" is the establishment of an equilibrium, and the best
thing that could happen to a man is that the equilibrium, once restored, should be permanent.

But on this theory pleasure 1s felt

only durIng the repletion by whioh we approach this best condition,
When we have reached it and are steadily persisting in it there is
no longer any process of repletion and consequently no pleasure.
Pleasure accompanies our progress to the good, but not our enjoyment of it; that will be the neutral state, painless but not pleas
urable.

This is what is meant by the view that pleasure is always

"beooming," never is "being."

However, it should be noted that

intelleotual pleasure haa more of "being" and less of "becoming tf
than oorporal pleasure.

Now the more a thing becomes real, the

more it tends toward stability and repose.

That is why the philO-

sopher, through contemplation, can reach the mean state between
pleasure and psi n, where there is perfect stability and repose
because there is fulness of being.
Aristotle only gradually movos away from the Platonic view or
pleasure.

In the early Magns; Moralia we find the follo\v-lng defini

11
tion: "Pleasure is a restoration of each to its own nature from
that which runs counter to it. n16 Again, something very similar
occurs in the Rpetoric: "We may say that pleasure is a movement of
the soul and a conscious restoration of it as a Whole to its normal
state of being; and that pain is the oPPosite. n17

Probably in

these instances Aristotle is not trying to be scientifically accurate.

Ho is content to base his doctrine on a generally accepted

definition, at least aftel" he has somewhat modified it.
The discussion of pleasure in Book VII of the Nioomachean
whether it was originally a part of the Eudemian Ethics or

~thics,

pot, seems to mark an intermediate or transitional stage of davelppment in the Aristotelian dootrine.
~inly

Here Aristotle, thinking

of the pleasures vlich involve little or no disturbance of

ithe natural balance, calls pleasure an activity,

An

~ctivity

as well as a state

~ivities

that restore us to our natural balanced state are pleasant

~ncidcntally,

(I~,')

~\I£PYE'Cl.

may be good, he says.

The ac-

but the activity involved is that of the part of our

pature which has remainod in its natural cond:i.tion.

There are ac-

tivities like those of thought which are pleasant \Yi thout involving

a deficiency or disturbance of the balanced state at all.

M1en we

16Aristotle, r~agna Moralia, 1205 b, 7. The translation is
taken from A. K. Griffin, Aristotle's PSlChOlOf of Conduct, (London, 1931)" p. 35. Whether the lAa~ni' Moral1a s an authentic work
pf Aristotle is doubted by many 8C101ars at present.

17Ar1stotle, Rhetoric, I,ll, 1369 b, 33.
again GrIffin's,
35.

p;

The translation is

12
are in our natural state we take pleasure

1;:1

what is pleasant in

itself; when we are being restored to it, in things not pleasant
in themselves.

In short, pleasures are not processes of bsaoming

but activities.

Furthermore, only some of them are incidental to

processes, namely, those that accompany the restoration of our nature; the others are incidontal to action.

Therefore, pleasure is

not a sensible process of restoration but "unimpeded activity of
the na.tural state. nlB
The treatment given pleasure in Book X of the Nicomachea.n
Eth:hc.:!! is more complete and seems to belong to Aristotle's mature
years.

He not only criticizes the views of others19 but states his

own doctrine positively.20

PleD.sure, he says, is like seeing in

that it is complete at each moment of its existence; it does not
become any more perfeot in quall ty by lasting lonseI'.

Therefore

it cannot be a movor;·16nt or a process of transition; for all movement takes tirae, airas at a certain end, and is complete only when
it has attained its end.

Each

p~n~t

of' a movement is incomplete and

is different in kind from the othel" parts and from the Whole.
Pleasure, however, 1s perfect in each moment, as is evident from
the fact that being ploased does not take time.

Besides, we cannot

18Ar1stot1e, Nioomaohean Ethics, VII, 12" 11.53 a, 14, The stu...
dent's Oxford Aristotle, trans.
Ross (tondon, 1942), v:- --!There are no numbers for the pages in this edition.]

w. n.

19Ibiq., X, 1, 1172 at 19 - X, 3, 1174 a, l2.
20Ib1d., X, ), 1174 a, 13 - X,

5,

1176 a,

29.

13
be said to

~

pleased quickly or slowly, though we :nay become

pleased quickly or slowly.

If pleasure were a

tr~1sition,

a resto-

:r'ation, it would be infel"ior to that in which it culminates, and
while we were pleased we would be restless till we reachod the
state to which pleasure leads.

But pleasure is in fact something

complete 1n itself and satisfactory in every moment of itself, jus
li1(e the activity of perception or of thoug,ht.
It will be remembered that Aristotle defined pleasure in Book
VIr as "the unimpeded activity of' the natural state."

In an impor-

tant passage in Book X he distinguishes pleasure from activity; he
recognizes a difference between it and genuine activities like
those of seeinr; and thinldng. 21 Pleasure Is not 00 methlng that we
do but a sort of crowning perfection that attaches to tho doing of
things.

This distinction is a notable advance over Book VII.

passage is worth quotinG.

The

"Pleasure completes the activity not as

the corresponding state does, by its immanence, but as an end whic
supervenes, as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of
their age.

So long, then, as both the intelligible or sens1.ble ob-

ject and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as they

2lJean Leonard, S.J" distincuishes two Aristotelian views of
pleasure in trie Nic02nachean Ethics. One is found in Book VII,
where Aristotle seems to identifI pleasure and actiVity. The othe
is found in Books II and X, where pleasure is described as a 21"0ReIt of m1 activity. Leonard concludes that Books II and X were
WI" t en about the s~ue time, while Book VII is earlier.
In arguin
for the similarity of Books II and X, he cites two passages from
Book II, chapter 3: 110 b 4 and 110/.j. b 15. He compfu'os these wit
Book X, chapters [~and
respective X See ea Leonard, S. J., !!!!.

t

,

.

..

-

14
should be, the pleasure will be involved in the activlty.ff22

He

also makes a distinction between the kinds of pleasure tb,at is more
exact and detailed than the one in Book VII.

It runs as follows:

For they [pleasure and activity] seem to be bound together
and not to admit of separation, since without activity
pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed
by the attendant pleasure. For this reason pleasures seem,
too, to differ in kind. F'oI' things different in kind are,
we think, completed by different things-and similarly we
think that activities differing in kind are completed by
things different in kind. 110w the actl vi ties of thou[')'lt
differ from those of the senses, and both diifor among
themselves, in kind; so, therefore, do the pleD.su:t>es that
complete them. This may be seen, too, from the fact that
each of the pleasuros is bound up with tho activity it
completes~3 For an activity is intensified by its proper
pleasux·e.
In view of the

doctl~ine

in Bool{s VII and X of the NioorIlachean

Ethics the following definition of pleasure would seom to represent
the mind of Aristotle.

"Pleasure is the croVln:tng perfection of the

unimpeded activity of the natural, balanced state of a being."
With the presentation of Aristotlets doctrine on tho nature of
pleasure the Vlork of the first chapter of this thesis is complete.
A brief

slliru~ry

of its main points will not bo out of place.

The purpose of this thosis is to discovel" and pre3ent St.
Thomas's answer to the question, "What is pleusure?Tf

Investigatl01

has shown that St. Thomas has four more or less extended treatment I
of pleasure in his writings, each in a major V'tork and each in a di11-

22Arlstot1e, :Ucomachean Ethics, X, 4, 1174 b 31 - 1175 a 1,
trans. aoss, ~ Studpont'!!. Q.xford Aristotle, V.

23~., 1175 a 20-31.
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ferent context.

These four works will be tho primary sources for

this study and will be taken up in their chronolo;:::ical order, as
follows: the C,ornrnentarl 2a
mentar:t,: .2!!
Summ~

~

~

Sentences, the De Veri tatE:!, the

~

Nicomachean Ethics, and the PrimB; Secundaj! of the

Theologiae.
St. Thomas himself considers it useful in understanding the

problem to advert to the Platonic and Aristotelian views on tho
nature of pleasure.

To Plato, pleasure was "becoming," an aCOOln-

panying phenomenon of transitions and developnents and not fully
real.

For Aristotle, pleasure was the crowning perfection of the

unimpeded activity of the natural state of a being.
the view of St. Thomas.

And now for

CHAPTER II
DELECTATlq AND PASSIO
In a textual and exegetical study the question of terminology
Is of primary importance.

RecognizinG this, chapter two will at-

tempt to clarify and define the two key terms that will come up
again and again in this study.

Both terms are widely used by St.

Thomas and not always with the same meaning, a situation which
could lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

Therefore, before

undertaking the study proper, it seems best to obviate these possible difficulties.
It must first be determined what
pleasure.

\"JO

I'd St. Thomas uses for

It seems that thore are five possibilities: delectatio,

t3audium, exultatlo,

laetiti~,

and jucW1ditas.

Investigation has

shown that delectatio is the generic term, while the other four are
species.

This is very clear in the Prima Secundae, where St. Tho-

mas quotes Avlcenna with approval: "Respondeo

dicend~~

quod gaudiun

ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo ~ Anit.1E!, est quaedam species deleetationis. ffl In the reply to the third objection to the same arti-

lThornas Aquinas, s.un1Jua ,!:heolo{;!::.~a~, I-II, 31, 3 c, ad. Petrus
Caramello (Turin, 195'0). This VID rli: will heroafter be l"eferred to
as S. T. I or I- II as the reference ,:lay be.

-

-

16

17
ole Thomas says: "Ad tertIum dioendurn quod alia nomIna ad deleotationem pertlnentia, aunt imposita ab effectibus delectatlonls: nam
laetlt1a Imponltur a dilatatione cordla, ac ai diceretur lat1tia;
exultatio vera dloltur ab exterioribus signia deleotationis interIorIs, quae apparent exteriua, inquantum scilioet interius gaudium
pros1lit ad exteriora; juounditas vero dioitur a quibuadam apeolallbu8 laetitiae signia vel effectibua.

Et tamen omnia ista nomi-

na videntur pertinere ad gaudium: non enim utlmur eis nisi in
naturis rationalibus."2
The last sentence of this quotation brings us to an important
distinction.

Although Thomas says that delectati2 1s the generio

term tor pleasure, he usually restricts its meaning to pleasures
of the sense appetite; s;aud1wn 1s the term used in speaklng of
pleasure of the rational appetlte, especially in the later works.
This 1s olear from the body of the

a~tlole

whloh has just been

quoted, where Thomas says: "Delectamur:' 8nlm et in his quae '. naturallter ooncupisoimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae conouplsclmu!
secundum rationem.

Sed nomen gaudil non habet looum nisl In delec-

tatlone quae consequltur rationem: unde gaud1um non attrlbulmus
brutls animallbus, sed solum nomen deleotationls.",3
Thus far only the Prima Seoundae has been used to determine
the Thomistlc term for pleasure_

2!_!., I-II, 31, 3 ad ,3.
3Ibld., In corp.

-

It will be remembered that thls
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was the fourth or the four

sourcea.

What about the other

A quotation from the earliest of them, the Co~nentarz ~

three?
~

~ajor

Sentences, will show that tho doctrine is similar, even though

it is not expressly stated that eaudium is a anacies of qelectatio.
"[G]audium at delectatio licet haboant unum objectum
non tamen est unum objectum secundum rationem.

secund~~

rem,

Bonura enim conju!lc-

tum realiter facit delectationem; sed conjunctmu secundum apprehensionem facit gaudlum.

Laetitia vero, exultatio at jucunditas sunt

idem quod gaudium, nisi quod oxprirnu.nt quosdam gaudii effectus, ut
dictum est.,,4

Two things in this passage are noteworthy.

First,

the distinction here made between delectatio and gaudiu.m again assigns delectatio to the sense appetites, but gaudium is said to
arise when a being knows that it is in possession of some good object.

The kind of knowledge 1s not speoified, so gaudium is not

restricted to the intellectual appetite.

The solution to this

question in the Sentences indicates only that conju.."1ctum z:eall tep
means "physically" while conJu,IlctW!! secund.um
C'

"intentionally.lf='

apprehe:qsione~

means

Second, laetitia, exultatio, and jucundita:!! are

again called effects of gaudium.

These brief

cor.~nents

by no means

exhaust the doctrinal importance of this passage, and it will come
up for more detailed consideration in the next ohapter.
To surn up briefly, the generic term for pleasure used by St.

4-rn

-

IV Sent.,

49, 3,

1, sol.

J.~, ad 1.
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Thomas is delectatl0, though in practice this word 1s frequently
restricted to pleasure of the sense appetites.

Gaudium is a spe-

cies of pleasure, is restricted to :::nean pleasure of the rational
appetite in later works, but
from the knowledce that a

also rofor to the pleasure arisine

ca~

800d

has been acquired.

~titi~,~

tatio and jucunditas are effects of' SB;,udium and take their names
from the speclf'ic effects produced.

In pass inc it might be well

to remark that delectatio is usually translated as "pleasure" and
saudiu.l1! is rendered" joy. t.
The term :e.assiq, will be of importance because St. Thomas twice
asks !futrum. delectatio si t passio," first in tho Cornmentarz .2..n
Sentences, and again in the Prima
answer is in the affirmative.

~ecundae.

~

In both instances the

St. Thomas also speal<:s of delectatlQ

as pasaio in the other two primary sources of this study and in
other works as well.

But simply to translate passi'?, as "passion"

when it is applied to pleasure would be w1wlse, for
moan not only "passion tt but considerably. more.

pas~

may

Besides, pleasure

does not seem to be a passion as wo understand that word today, but
rather a feeling or an emotion.

Tho distinction between the terms

"pa.ssion" and "emotion n as used by modern philosophers and the tern:
l?assio as used by St. Thomas is well expressed by Father Joseph Le
Rohellec.
Les philosophes modernes distinguent entre emotiop. et
tass!on. Lt emotion d6signerait un mouvement SUQit et momenano; ia passion desi~erait un mouvement affectlf prolonge,
en1"&.oine par l' habitude et devenu uno sec(mde nature. Au.
dire de.plusieurs, los paSSions seraient des inclinations
pervertie. --Saint Thomas, au contralre, prenant le terms
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passion dans un sens plus general, parce que plus etymologique et plus metaphysique, ll.li .fait sir;nifier tout acte de
llappetit senSlible, qutil soit violent ou calme, rapide ou
prolonge. • •• [E]n tout cas 18. passion au sens thomiste
no peut. janlB.is desAgner una b.abi tude, elle siE71ifie essentiellemont uno acte.
st. Thomas, says Lo Rohellec, uses tho word 12,33Sio in a sense that
includes, at least to so:ne extent, what tho moderns moan by both
passion and emotion.

.!!2

Thomas differs, however, because for him pas-

always moans the act and not the mood or habit which the term

"passion ll now implies in its technical sense.
The meaning of Eassio in St. Thomas as

r~iven

by I.e Hohellec,

"tout acte de l'appetit sensible,1I cannot now be accepted as the
final definition of the word as applied to delectatio but it will
serve as a startinG point.

For the sake of clarity and accuracy

it will be necessary to work out from the toxt of St. Thomas the
chiof meanings of :eass:I;,o, so that it may be determined which of
these meanings applies when Thomas says tldelectatio est passio."
The

VI)

rk of this part of the second chapter will be applied througb-

out the thesis and as early as the

beGin~1ing

of the third chapter,

for Thomas begins his treatrnent of pleasure in the

Commentar~

2a

.!?l!2 Sentenoes with the question "utrll."U deleotatio sit passio. 1f
To make a thorough study of 129.s8io in St. Thomas would be a
thesis in itself. 7

The study underta.lren here, since it is only a

6R• P. Joseph La Rohellec, "La Theorle des Passions chez Saint
Thomas," Problemes Philosophique~, eds. C. Larnicol et A. Dhellemmes, e.s.s., (ParIs, 193~), p. 3Lt4.
7Suoh a thesis has been written.

See Kenneth M. Kunert, S.J.,
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means to an end, cannot be long or exhaustive, and must oonfine itseli' to a very few works of St. Thomas.

Aocordingly, the treatment

Given in De Veritate, question 26, "De passionibus animae," w111
serve as the major source, with an oooasional reference to the
S~~a

Theologiae for the sake of clarity.
The first article in question 26 of

~

"utrum anima separata a corpore patiatur."

Veritate is entitlod
At the very begirL'1ing

of the body of the article Thomas remarks: "Respondeo d1cendum,
quod ad evidentiam hujus quaestionis et sequent1u,"ll soire oportet
quid proprie sit passio. n8
invostir:ation.

Here, then, we are at the heart of the

Thomas continues:

Soiendum est igitur, quod nomon passionis dupliciter surnitur:
communi tel' et propria. Communitor quidem dioitur passio 1'0coptio alioujus quocurnque modo; et hoc sequendo significationen1 vocabuli: nam passio diel tur a patin graeee, quod est recipere. Proprio vero dieitur pasaio seeundmn quod actIo et
passio in motu consistunt; prout scilicet aliquid reoipitur in
patiente per viam motus. Et quia omnia lllOtus est intel" oontraria, oportet illud quod reoipitur in pl-tionte, esse oontrarium alioui quod a patiente abjicitur."J
The general meaning of .:easslo, then, is a reception of Eny kind in
the being affected by the action of an agent.

But properly speak-

ing it t"leans a ohan(:,;e caused by transient action.
aul ts in the reception of

S)

This change

1'0-

me quality or pert'ection which foroes

"The !ifetaphysios of the Passions aooording to the Doctrine of St.
Thomas Aquinas," Unpublished Masterfa Thesis (Loyola University,
Chicago, 1953). The writer is greatly indebted to this work for
much of the material in this second part of' Chapter II.
BThomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 26, 1 0, 5th Turin ad.
1927). This will be referred to hereafter as De Y!£.
9Ibid.

(Turin,
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out its contI'ary.

Therefore in its pI'oper and more restricted

sense passl0 inoludes the notions of' motion and contrariety.
In a later WOI'k, the

~rima ~

of the

S~~a

Theologiae, St.

Thomas goes beyond this definition, enlargine and clarifying it.
Note that the order has been reversed, so that

Eassi~

eroRrie is

spoken of first.
Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dioltur. Uno
modo proprie: at sic pat1 dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositiona romovetur. Paasio enim est effectus act1onis: in rebus
autem naturalibus contraria ar;unt et patit:mtur ad Invieem,
quorum unum removet alterum a sua natural! d1sposltione.
-Alio modo, dioi tur passlo communi tar, seoundw'!1 quamoumque
mututlonem, et1am s1 pertineat ad perfectlonem naturae; siout
intelligere vel sentire diel tur Eati quod(~arl1.10
The important advance in this passaCe is that the notion ofeassio
proDrie has been ohanged to mean the removal of a being from its
natural state or disposition, whereas in

~ V~ritate

Thomas said

that a being undergoes :eassio propria whanever it receives the contrary of oomethinc; already possessed.

In other

\'0

rds, the notion

of oontrariety is not insisted upon in this present passaee.

This

differenoe wi 11 be returned to latel'.
Another point to be notioed is that St. Thomas refers 2assio
~ommuniter

even to perfeotions of intellection and volition.

It

will be of help to find out how these two different kinds of passio
may be found in a being.

In

~ ~eritate

Thomas says:

Paeaio 191tur primo modo oommuniter aooepta invenitur in
anima, at in qllallbet oreatura, eo quod omnis oreatura habet
aliquid potentialltatis adm.ixtum, ratione cUjUS omnis oreature

10S.T., I, 97, 2 o.

--
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subsistens est alicujus receptiva. Pass10 ve:r'o secundo modo
accepts. non invenitur nisi ubi est Motus et contrarietas.
Motus autem non Invenitur nIsi 1n aorporibus at contrarletas
formarum vel qualitatum in salls generabillbus et corruptibllibus.. Unde sola hu:jusmodi propria hoc modo pat! possunt.
Unde anima, cum sit incorporea, hoc modo -;:>ati non potest: et
si etlam. aliquid raoipiat, non tamen hoc fit per tltansMutatlonom a. oontrario In contrarlul1l, sed p~r simplicem af;entis
influxum, slcut aer illmninatur a sole. 11
~eoording

to this explanation, any being composed of act and poten-

cy can be a subject of J.'!assi£ cOn1muniter, for any change from potency to act can be called Eassio in this broad sense.
!per sense, however,

J2.assi~

ition and contrariety.
~odies;

In its pro-

includes the two characteristics of mo-

Motion is found only in beings which have

contrariety of forms is found only in beings subject to

I,o;eneration and corruption.

Therefore passl0 proprie can refer only

ito bodies and to bodily chances and modifications.
Paasio in its broad, general meaninc (cpmmuni tel") cannot un...
~ergo

division, for then it would not extend to all cases of ohange

frroIll potency to act.
~her

But in its strict sense (aroprie) it is fur-

distinguished in the PrimB:, Secundae.

~ivision

of the term

Eass~~

Here we find a triple

going from the general sense to the

~ost

strict.

Note that this naw distinction returns to the point

~ade

earlior that a being can undergo Rassio

Eropri"~

whenever It is

removed from its natural disposition.
Pati dlcitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communlter, secundum quod
orone recipere ost pati, etaim s1 nihil abjiciatur a 1"6: stout
ai dieatur aerem pati, quando illwn.inatur. Hoc autem magiS
propria est perfici quam pati. --Alio modo dicltur pati pro-

ll~ Y!£., 26,

1 c.

prie quando aliquid reclpltur cum alterlus abjectione. Sed
hoc contingit duplicitor. Qunndoque anir.1 abjicitur id quod
non est conveniens rei: siout cum oorpus animalis sanatur,
dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aecrltudlne abjecta.
-Alio modo, quando e convol"'SO contingit siout aogrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abjocta. Et
hic ost propriissimus modus passionls. Nam pati dicitur ex
eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem: quod auter;1 recedlt ab
eo quod est sibi conveniens maxima videtur ad aliud trahi. 12
According to this triple division,

~~

in its strictest sense

involves the loss of oonlething which is proper to the boine receiving the action of the agent, sinoe in this type the patient is
especially drawn to the agent oausing the ill effect.
mentions sickness as an example of this :eassio

St. Thomas

Eroprilssim~.

Thel:"'6 is also a less strict though still proper meaning of
the term Eassio.

In this meaning the patient loses somothing not

proper to itself in order to gain something whj.ch is properly its
own, and the example given is tho return to good health from sickness.

This is still passio

Erop~i_t!

because there is motion causine

the reception of one contrary with the consequent loss of its opposito.

But in this case the thing lost is not pl"toper to the beinE

underGoing the 12assio, while the thin£, received is proper and fitting to it.
One further distinction re.':lains to be made.
tinction made by St. Thomas between 12assio
animalis.

It is the dis-

corEoral~s

and 12o.38io

This new distinction will be so en to apply to the two

divisions of

I~assio

EroEl'ie that have just boon discussed.

I .. II, 22, 10.
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In looking at the terminology of this new distinction, one is
lad to think that EasSio

~n1mal~~

would refer in rome way to acts

of intellection, volition and sensation.
already been placed under RaBsio
ing of the term.

These acts, however, have

c.o~':1qni tel',

tho most general mean-

The new distinction refers to pa8s10 proprie with

its notes of motion and contrariety, as the following quotation
makes clear.
Alio modo dicitur pa8sio propria, quae consistit in abjectiono unius contraril at alterlus rocept;ione per v1am
transmutatlonis; et 11io modus passlonis animae convenire non
potest nisi ex. corpo:r~e; at hoc dupliei ter. Uno modo secundwn
quod unitur corpori ut forma; et sic oompat1tur oorpori patient! pass:Lone corporal1. Alio modo prout unitur ut motor; at
sic ex operatione animae transm~tatio fit in corpore, quae
quidem passio dic1tuI' a.nimalis. :3
In this distinction 'rhomas 1s spoa1t!nr; of the two ways in wh ich
Easslo, EI'oprie can pertain to the soul.

In both of these ways the

EassiC!. pertains to tho soul in and through its union with the body
and not directly.
In the first way,

pas3~

pertains to the soul in so far as it

1s united to the body a.s its substantial form.

Because of this

substantial union the soul qomnat1tl!.r:: that is, it underCoes the
sa.me thinss that the body undoI'Coos.
Is called passi?

~rhis

;;1a.nner of "compassion"

~o£Eoralis.

In the second way, ,Rassio portains to the soul in that it is
united with the body as its mover, as the source of the body's motion and the prino:Lple of its action.

13De Y.!U:., 26, 3 Erin.

In this case tho soul is
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considered not only as the substantial form of the body but also
as the form giving the body and the composite the power to act.
Thus the soul throW':.h its various operations is the cause of bodily
changes.

This typo of bodily change in which the soul is involved

as movor Thomas calls

~ssio anlmal~s.

With this distinction the
a brief summary is in order.
St. Thomas is

deleotati~.

11.0

rl{ of Chapter II is complete and

The generic term for Dloasure used by

-

But quite often, though not always, de-

lectatio is restricted to mean pleasure of the sense appetite and
Igaudium is employed in speaking of: pleasure of the intellectual apLa~~iti~,

petite.

~~ultati~,

and jucunditas are effects of: gaudium

Five meanings of: the term Eassl0 were discussed.
lWas t he most general meaning, Etassio

communite~,

First there

which extends to

any change from potency to act, even \then the chanGe involves the
perfectlnc of a being as in intellection, volition and sensation.
The second meaning of Ellssio, the proper sense or Eassio Eroprie,
was seen to involve the two notos of motion and contrariety.

St.

Thomas then divided this second meaning into rassio Eropriissime
and pl1ssio minus proprie.

In the most propor senso Etlssio denotes

the loss of ro metlling proper to a beine receiving the action of an
agent.

In its less proper sense :eassio denotes the loss of some-

thing not

pl~opeX'

to a being when it cains something which is pro-

parly its own.
A final distinction, applyinc to both divisions of
12roEI~~,

~!!!E.

was found in the terms Eassl0 c.orEoralls and passto a11i-
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(comEa~~)

malls.

The soul is said to underco or partioipate in

Dassi~

cOrporslis when it is affooted because of its substantial

union with the body as tho substantial form of the oomposi to.

The

soul is said to undergo Eassio animalis when it acts as mover in
the various operations of the comjlosite whioh result in bodily
chances.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the writer does not mean
to imply t!lSt these are all the meanings and distinctions of the
term Esssio in the writings of St. Thomas.

Only those distinotions

and meaninGs were discussed which will aid in the study of the primary souroes in tho succeeding ohapters.

Now that the way has been

prepared, it is time to turn to the first of the primary sources,
the COJ:ll!i1.entarz 2!l

~

Sentenoes.

CHAPTE!R III

_

PLEASURE IN THE COMMENTARY
..
.. -ON

TH~
........--

SENTENCES
....

-..;.~.;..;;.;..~

The principal discussion or pleasure in the C,om::1entarx £!! the
Sentences occurs in Book IV, distinction

49.

This distinotion is

conoerned wi th "the rewards or the good, tI and is divided into five
questions.

The first question treats beatitude; the second, the

vision of God, "in which beatitude principally consists Tf ; the
third, pleasure, "whioh formally cOl"'apletes beatitude"; the fourth,
the gifts which are contained in beatitude; the fifth, the aureolae, "by whioh beatitude is perfected and adorned."l
The third question is divided into five artioles whioh treat
of the nature of pleasure, its causes, its relation to sadness,
the morality of pleasure and the relation between spiritual and
corporal pleasures.

The exact titles of the five articles are

interesting, for they throw light on the viewpoint and approach of
St. Thomas.

The first artiole asks !!whether pleasure is passion;

the seoond, tfwhether the only oause of pleasure is an unimpejed
operation of a habit oonf'orrnable to nature"; the third, "whether
sadness is contrary to pleasure tf ; the f'ourth, "whether every pleaslIn IV ~., 49, 1 prin. The Parma edition of the 0:eet:!
Omnla,Vol.
VII, ha.s been used throughout.
,
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ure is good"; and the fifth, "whether bodily pleasures are stronger
than spiritual ploasures. n2
st. Thomas begins his inquiry into the nature of pleasure by
asking "whether pleasul~e is a passion. ,,3

This is tho flrst article

where his viewpoint is more metaphysical than psycholo[':ical.
opens his reply by remarking that a thing

[~alns

IWhen it acquires a perfection proper" to itself.
be moved toward a proper perfection in two ways.

He

stability and vigor
Now a beine can
The first is by

natural inclination wh:i.ch requires no knowledf'"e, as when a stone
~alls.

This is called natural movement..

But a being can be moved

itoward a perfection proper to itself in another way which requires
~hat

the being be endowed with the power of cognition.

This seoond

~ay is oalled either animal appetite4 or intelleotual appetite, depending on whether the cognition involved is sensory or intelleotual.

Thomas then points out a similarity betweon natuI'al movement

and animal appetite.
[5 ]lout in terminatione motus naturalls est quaedam vl/?:oratio
naturalis ejus quod movetur, ita in 8.ssocutlone perfect:i.onis
in quam tendit appetitus anlmalls, est quaedam quietatio ipsius, seu vic-oratio ejus, praesupponens cognltionem perfectionis jam canjIDlctae, siout appetitus praesupponebat co[~i-

2Ibid., q. 3 prin.
Jlbi,d., a. I prine For the sake of uniformity und convenience
the term fiassio will he:peafter be translated as "passion, tf Uote
that in t Is article Thomas is determining whether pleasure falls
under the category of passion rather than giving it a psyohological
classifioation.
4"anlmal appetite" translates -the Thomistic phrase 8.ppetitus
anlmalis.

,30

tlonem perfeotlonls nondum habitae; et taIls vigor sive quietatio appotitus vocatur doloctatio; unde et1aJ:l COl1t:1ontator
dicit in 10 ~th1corum quod delectatio est quaedam superfloritic naturae.
In the passaGe just quoted occurs tho first descript:lon of pleasure
It is called v1f":;or s1 v:.~ 9,uletutio apoeti tus, VCL loh might be transI.

lated "a feeling of satisfaction of the appetite."O

Thomas makes

an important point when ho says that pleasure presupposes 1010wledge
of the acquired perfection, just as appetency pl'1esupPosGS know!ledge of the perfection to be acquired.

It is noteworthy that only

animal appetite is compared to natural motion.

In dealinG with in-

tellectual appetite Thomas says:
Est autem duplex appetitus, sicut et cognitio, scilicet sensitivae at intellectivae partis. Appetitus autem sensitivae
partis est virtus in organa corporali, at ost i~nediatum principium corpora11s motus; unde omnia quae accidunt in appetltu
sensitivo sunt conjuncta cum quadam transmutatione corporall;
quod non accidlt In his quae sunt in appetltu Intellectivo,
nisi passione la1'[';e accepta, et Improprie, ut supra dictum
est; unde delectatio quae est In appetitu sensitivo quaedam
passio est; non autem delectatio quae ost in intel1ectivo~ nisi passione large accepta.7
Three things in this passage deserve special note.

5-In IV

-sent.,

49, 3, 1,

First, it seems

sol. 1.

6 In the very beginning of the solution from which this passage
Is taken we read: TlQuaelibet res quando portincit ad pl"oprla:n perfectionOlll, consequitur stabilimentum et vlf.oI·em; sieut cor'")ora
quando perveniunt ad termino! motus sui natural is, quia in loco
naturali conservantur." (Stress supplied.) At first glance the
terms viGor and visoratio seem opposed to 9,uietatl,o and atabllimentum •. Yet on second thought they soem to be an attemp€ €o describo the dynamic and static aspects of what we mean by a "sense
of well-being" or the feeling that "itts good to be alive."
7Ibid.
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pleaI' that the appetites, both sensitive and intellectual, are the
seats of pleasure.

Second, Thomas uses the term

a.ppetitu~

sensl-

ti vus here instead of apoeti tus 8.,n1111a118, yet he seems to be ta11!::in,S about the same thing when he uses these terms.

The rest of thi

artiole and the succeeding ones lend support to the oonolusion that
the terms a1"e synonoruous.

Thil"d, a distination is

~~lade

between

pleasure of the sense appetite and pleasure of the intellectual
appetite.

The sensa appetite is a material faoulty and is the im-

mediate principle of bodily movement.

Therefore movement of the

sense appetite will necessarily involve bodily movement and gJve
rise to a passion in the strict sense, n8.8sio 2roErie.

The intel-

lectual appetite, on the other hand, is an im.ma.terial faoulty and
hence is not moved in the strict senso.

Further, it is not an im-

mediate principle of bodily movoment, so that its operation does
not necessa.rily involve bodily change.

Therefore a. movement of the

intellectual a.ppetite will be a pa.8sion only in the wide sense,
nassiq

c9~muniter.

But Thomas has said that pleasure is a quiet inc of the appetite, not a movement of it.

ilow then can pleasure be a paSSion?

The objection is answered as follows: "Non cst incol'lvcnicms motum
per accidens termlnari ad alium m.otum. • ••

Delectatio ergo, In-

quantum hujusmodl, semper conslstit in allqua terminatione motus.
Sed tamen quia in terrninatlone motus appeti tiv-i con8urtit quldam
motus, in quo passio animalis conslstit; ideo pa.ssionem incsse
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~ccidit deleotationi; sed inest per se deleotationi sensitlvae. ltli
jJ.1ven here, however, Thomas does not explioitly assert that pleasure is a passion.

He rather says that the quieting of the appe-

ti te gi ves l~lse to a mover:lent in which the psychical passlon9 oonsists.

Nor does he say that the termination of the movement of the

appetite is a passion.

The use of the verb

to be bound up with" instead of

~

i~csse.,

"to belong to,

is signifioant.

Thomas's hesitation to oall pleasure, evon of the sense appstite, a passion in the strict sense is further revealed in the
follmtlng two passages.

The first passage shows that pleasure Is

unique among the passions bocause it consists in the termination
of the movement of tho appetite.

Discussing whether or not pleas-

ure is in time Thomas says:
[E]tiam aliae animas passiones quantum ad id quod est ex parte
animae, non sunt in tempI's nisi per accidens, inquantum
scilicet eis conjungltur motus ex parte corporis; tamen delectatl0 magis habet rationem quod non sit in tempore quam
aliae passiones: quia nliae passiones cOl1sistunt in appetitu
secundum quod tendit in aliquid, siout ira in vindictam et
odium in nocumentum alterius; sed delectatl0 consistit in
appetltu secundum quod ejus motue in suo appetibili adepto

8 Ibid., ad 1.

-

9This 1s the writerts translation of Enssio nnimalis. It will
be remembered from chapter II that this 1s the type of passio the
soul underGoes whon it acts as sJlover of the body and tho prInciple
of its action. It would be very helpful to Imow more about this
movement inYlhich the psychical passion consists and which has its
orisin in the quieting of tho moveClent of the appeti to. Some light
on the point Is given in the followlnJ passa~e from tho reply to
the next objection. "Operatlonem appetitus sensitivi consequitur
quaedam corporalis transmutatl0 secundum dllatationem et constrictlonem cordis et alia hujusl11odi.!f In TV Sent., 49, 3, 1, sol. 1
ad 2.
-
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terminaturj omnis autem terminus motus non est in tempore,
sed in instanti. lO
In the second passae6 Thomas says that the bodily chan:::os
which follow upon the

op~ration

sIon stl'>ictly so called.

of the sonse appetite are the pas-

"Quamvis operatio, inquantum operatio,

non at t passioj tamen Dotest habel"e passionem annexam, vel sicut
praocedentem, vel sicut subsequenteml • ••

sed ut consequentemj

sicut operationem appetitus sensitivi consequltur quaedam corporalis transmutatio secundum dilatationem et cOIlstrictionem cordis et
alia hujusmodij at sic quamvis dolectatio sit circa operationem,
tamen inquantum est delectatio sensitlva, est in passions quadam
conslstens. nll

In brief, St. Thomas simply does not call pleasure, even of
the sense appetite, a passion in the strict senss.
not far to seek.

The reason is

It will be remaln.bored from Chapter II that pas-

sion in the strict sense involves the notes of motion and contrariety.12

Since pleasure is the termination of appetitive motion it

cannot be a paSSion in the strict senss.
closely oonnected

\~th

But since pleasure is so

appetitive movement "est in passione quadam

eonsistens."
To make the picture complete, however, a briof passage which
occurs in question 1 of distinction

49

cannot be overloolced.

In

~'N'STOW~
101£ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, 3 sol. ad 3.

V

LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY

llIbld., sol. 1 ad 2.
12See above, pp. 21 and 22.

-S-,
)

L./8R~··/
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view of what is said there, it is surprising that St. Thomas does
not take up the point in his major treatment of pleasure :in question 3, which has just been discussed.

The passage reads as fol-

loWS:
[D]uplex est deleotatio. Una quae prlleoedit asseoutionem finis, et haec est ordinabilis in aliud: potest onlm ordinari
ad porfectam operationem, inquantum. videlicet ilIa in quibus
delectamur attentius agimus. Alia delectatio est quae consequitur assecutionem finis; et ilIa efficitur per operationem
quae fini conjungit: et idoo haec delectatio non est ipsa
beatitudo, sed quaedara boatitudinis perfectio, et forma, ut
supra dictum est. 1 3
Thomas here indicates tha.t there is a certain plea.sure in the very
movement of the appetite, before the desirablo object is gained.
This mi,cht be callod a pre-delectation.

It is impossible to say

why this point is not tal{en up later when pleasure is explicitly
treated.

The point finds full development only in the Pri;.ma §!,-

cundae.

A conjecture is that St. Thomas is reacting aGainst the

Platonic doctrine of pleasure as a gonEn"ation or beco:ning.

Allying

himself with the Aristotelian pOSition that pleasure is the orowning perfection of an unimpeded operation, he calls it the terr:1ination of the movement of the appetite instead of the movernent itself
The Aristotelian influence comes out clearly when St. Thomas speaks
of pleasure as "quaedam perfectio operationi superveniens, ut decor
juventuti. tt1 4 This perfection is not tho form which specifies the
operation, but one which 1s superadded in the manner of a secondary
l3In IV ~.,

14I£!£., 3,

4,

49, 1, 2, sol. 2 ad 3.
sol.

3.
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porfection like health.

Neither 1s pleasure the operation itself,

but something destined to complete and perfect the operation. 1S
Here the viewpoint is more psychological and there is no effort to
assign pleasure to one of the oategories.
St. Thomas is always mindful that pleasure is more a perfection than the suffering of change, or
perfici plus quam pati."16

a.s

he would put it, nest

That is why he does not assign pleas-

ure to the category of £ass10 without reservation, usually in the
form of a qualifying phrase or expression.

He does, however, as-

sert that pleasure is passion in the wide sense, just as intellection, volition and sensa.tion, for example, are passions in the
wide sense. 17
Now that the nature of pleasure in the Sentences has been determined, an invostigation of its causes is the next step.

Undoubt~

edly, a knowledge of the causes will throw more lisht on the nature
of pleasure.
St. Thomas devotes an entire artiole to the oauses entitled
"Whether the only cause of pleasure is an unimpeded opel"ation of

l5 Ibid., ad 2 and 3.
l6 The reader may have the impression that too muoh stress is
beine plaoed on pleasure ns a quieting or termination of the movement of the appetIte. In addition to the passages already quoted,
the following deserve consIderation. "Cum delectatio consistat in
quietatione appetitus • • • " (In IV Sent., 1}9, 3, 2, sol. pri£.>
"Conveniens enim adveniena perReit TdOu! conventt at quieta inclinationcm in illud: at haec quietatio, secundum quod est percepta, ost delectatio." (~III Sent., 27, 1, sol. 2 ad 3.)

17~~ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, sol. 3 ad 3.
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~ habit conformable to nature. nlB

He begins tho solution by rG-

:ull"i:ing that pleasure, in so far aa it is a passion, is oOTilmon to
poth body and soul.

'l'herefore, like other things corrunon to body

and soul, it wlll have a for'mal element from the soul and a material element from the body.

From. the material elem.ent, only how a

be1ng is disposed to pleasure can be learned, but from the formal
pause comes the knowled'e of how a being is actually pleased.
The formal cause of any passion or operation is its object.
~he

object of pleasure is a suitable good that is possessed, "bonum

conveniens conjunctum."

st. Thomas reasons to this as follows.

Since pleasure belonGS to the appetitive part of the soul, its object must be some good, otherwise the appetltes "rvould not be moved.
But sinoe pleasure belongs to an a:poet! te re:tLng in possession of
~ts

objeot, the objeot must be some suitable good that 1s posses-

Now this suitable possessed Good whioh is the proper objeot
of pleasure must be some operation of the beine whioh is pleased.
Three reasons are assigned.

First, the ultimate perfeotion of a

being or faoulty lies in its operations.

Seoond, the suitable pos-

sessed good which oauses pleasure must be known as suoh, but it can
be known only in and through some operation.

Third, we come into

oontact with goods throur):l the opel"ations of our faculties.

Every

eood which attracts us can be eained and satisfy our appetites on13
througll the mediation of

S)

me operation.

Thoref'ore, operations are
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pf themselves the oause of' pleasure.
l'fot every operation, however, is the cause of plcasul"e, but
only those which arc unimpeded and proceed from habits; for an acquired good wi 11 not af'for'd pleasure unless it is also sui table
and natural.

Operations are made suitable and "second-nature"

through the formation of habits.

Naturally, if an operation is

impeded by hindrances from within or without it will give rise to
~1 ttle

if' any pleasure.

"1f herefore, tf conoludes St .. 1l homaa, tfthe

proper formal causa of pleasure is an unimpeded operation of a
labit conformable to nature. fl1 9
Having presented his positive doctrine, Thomas turns to answer
!the obvious objection that there are many suitable goods for a
Deinc besides its own operations.
~re

His ansv/er is that, while there

indeed many suitable goods, pleasure is derived trom them only

py means of some operation.

The reason is that a boing comes into

contact with goods outside itself' and becomes aware ot goods within
itself only in and through operations; there is no other wo.y.20
It should be noted tha.t in this reply St.. Thoraas has shifted
bis ground somewhat.

In the body of the article he spoke of opera-

tions as the formal causes of pleasure, since they are its proper
object and specify the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another.

But in this reply he seems to be speakinG of opol"ations as

19~., "Sic orgo causa fornmlis propria deleotationis est
operatio oonnaturalis habitus non impecUta. tt

20 Ib1d ., ad 1.
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efficient oauses upon whioh pleasure follows as a kind of natural
~omplel11ent.

The following passage would seem to bear this out.

It[D]alactatio anim operationem consequitur •• • • Ncc ilIa duo
sunt consideranda quasi duo bona, sed quasi unum bonum. S10ut anim
ex perfectione et perfectibili fit una res perfeota; ita ex deleo1iatione at operatione fit una operatio perfeota, quae ost re11c1~as; cum deleotatio sit operationis perfoctio. n21

Another brief passage that will throw
~he

following.

li[~'1t

on this point is

"The proximate cause or pleasure is an operation,

Ibut the romote cause is the objeot of the operation; just as in the
[pleasure of the blessed, • • • the proximate oause is the vision of

pod, but the first oause is God." 22 The oontext indicates that
effioient causes are hore spoken of, for very rarely is there ques~ion

of proximate and remote formal causes.
The conclusion is, then, that operations are both rormal and

~fficient

causes of pleasure, but under difrerent aspect: formal,

in so far as they are the objects of pleasure and speoify it to be
of a particular kind; effioient, in so far as they are the means
through whioh a being oomes into oontact with and possesses goods
~hich

are suitable to itselr. 23
21l.!! IV ~. t

22Ibi d., a.

5,

49,
sol.

3, L~, sol. 3.

4.

23An interesting oomr1ent on this point is the following.
"Operatio causat delectationcm partim in genere causae efficientis,
inquantum deleotatio non orltur nisi mediante opera.tiona, ex qua.
sequitur per natural em resultantlam, sicut passio sequitur ex 6S-
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The material cause of pleasure must be looked for in its subject.

"The subject of pleasure and of all paSSions of the soul is

the animal spirit, which is the proximate instrument of the soul
in -the operations which are performed through the body.,,24
1~/hat

Exactly

St. Thomas means by s12iritus animalls cannot be dotermined,

for the term is not further defined or B.mplified. 25

From the rest

of the present article, however, it seems that the term is an attel~lpt

to explain what modern psychology calls the "bodily resonanoe

pf an emotion.

Thomas speaks of an abundanoe of those spirits

which are the causes of the dilation of the heart, and, presumably,
pi' faster pulse rate, more rapid breathing, and the like.

thing seems olear.
passio

~imalis

One

St. Thomas is here thinking of pleasure as a

in whioh the soul is said to undergo paSSion be-

cause it acts as the mover of the body.
sentia subjecti: partim in genero causae formal is, inquantum operatio conveniens est objectum de1ectationis, eique speciem tribult:
delectatur enim qulspiam non tantur.l de l"e bona, sed etiam de rei
istius assecutlone at operations circa 111am. Priorem modum oausalitatis tradit B. Th. Q. 33, a.
ad 2. Posteriorem in IV Sent.,
dist. 49, q. 3, a. 2 c." Fr. Silvl1, COlllmentarii; !!! totam nrIiiim
secunda.~, Antuerplae, 1714, p. 219 D.

4,

24In IV ~., 49, ), 2, sol.
25S ohtltz t s Thomas-Lexikon and the Tabula Aurea give only two
other references to spiri,tus anim~1is, neither of: which treat of
its nature. However. this notIon is pr'obably derived from the
stoic doctrine of pneuma, a hot, breath-like substa.l'lcC which was
supposod to be tho prInciple of lifo. ArmstronG traces this doctrine throui,;,'h Aristotle and Plato back to the pre-Socratic "llvingstuff." Copleston notes its appearance in Bernardino Telosio
(1509-8B) and in Desoartes. See A. H. Armstrong An Introduction
to Anciont PhilOSOPh (Westminster, ~'i:aryland, 1949T; pp. 1~~-23, .
and Fre<!eri'Olt"C!oples on, S.J., A History: of Philosophi, (Westminster, Maryland, 1953), III, p. ~52.
--

t

Only the final oause of pleasure now remains to be discovored.
st .. Thomas does not explicitly mention the final cause of pleasure,
IJrobably beoause it is easily doducible from what he has said about
tthe nature of pleasure.

For, as the orowning perfection of an un-

lampered operation, it seems clear that pleasure is of itself in
rthe order of finality.

However, the su1 table Good, the bonu..rn .2..212-

rveniens, may be looked upon as the final cause of pleasure, since
~t

attracts a being and causes it to place those acts and opera-

~ions

which will put it in possession of the good and give rise to

pleasure.
Briefly, then, the four causes of pleasure are as follows:
~ormal,

unimpeded operations prooeeding from habits conformable to

~ature;

material, the animal spirit, whioh is the proximate instru-

pent of the soul in the operations which are performed through the
~ody;

effioient, the various operations which are the means through

tRhich a. being comes into contact \vi th and possesses goods whioh are
~uitable

for itself; final, none needed strictly speakinG, for

;>leasure is already in the order of finality, but suitable goods

may be considered as final causes of pleasant operations.
No aooount of the oauses of pleasure would be complete without
a

discussion of the role of lmowledgo in pleasure.

be said to be the cause of pleasul"'s in two ways.26

Knowledp:e oan
This is true

f'irst, on the part of the thing that is known, as when a man comes

~adge

26!a IV ~., 49, 3, 3, sol. 2 c.
here is apprehansio.

The word usod for know-

r.------------.
to know some good that is suitablo for himself and is pleased, presumably at the prospect of acquirinr:: the good.

In this way know-

lodge is the cause of every pleasure, for the appetites are aroused
through the knowledge of some good for the being.

Second, know-

ledge is said to be the cause of pleasure on the part of the knowledge itself, as when a man is "pleased not by the thing known but
by the very cognitive act throug;h which he knows the thing.

In

this second way, Thomas seems to be speaking of the operation of
knowing as the object of pleasure.

Therefore, knowledGe taken in

this sense would be a fOl'1mal cause of pleasure, for the formal
cause of pleasure is an operation as object, as has been seen.

In

the first way, considering knowledf;e from the aspect of the thing
known, apprehension of the suitable good seems to be mOre a condition than a cause.

!<'or unless the eood weI'e somehow known it could

not stir tho appetites and aI'ouse deelI'e for itself.
be st. Thomas's meaning when he says
is the oause of everl. pleasure.

tt~t

This seems to

knowledge of the suitable

But he might also be :t'eferl"ing to

the knowledze which makes a being aware that it is actually in possession of the good it has sought

aftel~

a.nd acquired; this too is

necessary oondition of pleasure.

HowoveI', it should be bOI'ne in

I

mind that pleasuI'e belongs to the appetitive powers, not to the
approhenslve. 27
Now that the role of knowledGe in pleasure has boen determinec

27~n III ~.,

15, 2, 1, sol. 2.

st. Thomas's distinction between pleasure and joy can be more
~aslly

understood.

Pleasure and joy have this in

com~on,

that thoy

~re caused by the possession of some good that has been desired. 28
Now a good or perfection can be possessed in two ways, physically
(realiter) and throu[',:)1 knowledge (secundll;Jn apnrehensipneD!).

When

a [!,Ood is physically possessed, pleasure 1s experienced; when a
;.:;ood is l~nown, joy arises. 29

'l'herefore joy is oonoel"ned with the

lope of future e;oods and the memory of past goods as well as with
those present, but pleasure Is concerned only with suitable goods
~ctually

pro sent and physically possessed.

Some interesting applications of this distinction are made to
~he

various

co~pitive

powers and their operations.

Because the

~

torior senses apprehend only things physically present, we are said
to be pleased by their operations.

The i.nteriozt senses apprehend

things both present and absent; therefore we both rejoice in and
are pleased by their operations.

One of the goods aotually present

to the interior senses, and thus a source of pleasure, is their own
operations.

The same operations will also be a source of joy inas-

28~ IV ~., 49, 3, 1, sol. 4. In this disoussion of pleasure and joy "to be pleased tJ translates delectari and Uto rejoice"
translates r.audere. "pleasure,1t of course, translates q~lectatio
and tr joy" tra11s1ates {:;audiwa. It is to be noted that joy is not
restricted to mean pleasure of the intellectual appptlte here in
the Sentenoes nor in the De Veritate.
29Ibld., and ad 1. "Gaudium et delectatio lioet habeant unum
objectuiii'Secundum rem, non tamen est unum objectum secundum rationem. Bonum enim conjunctum realitor fecit deleotationom; sed conjunctum seoundum apprehensionclU tacit eaudium."
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much as the interior senses know their own operations as well as
the operations of the exterior senses.

It se6ms that a parallel

argument oould be made for pleasure in the operations of the intelleot, for these operations are surely present to the intelleot.
But strangely enough the intellect is mentioned only onoe in this
disoussion, and in an example, as follows.

We are said to rejoice

in the eating of sweets, for the interior senses and the intellect
apprehend this as a suitable good for the exterior senses and for
the composite.

We are pleased also, of course, for the sweets are

a good really present to the exterior senses.

Therefore, the sa.me

good oan afford both joy and plea.sure, for it oan be actually possessed through the operations of the exterior senses and possessed
through knowledge by the operations of the interior senses and the
intelleot.

St. Thomas expr'ssses this as follows:

"[I]dem est oausa delootationis et gaudil, sed non, eodem ordine: primo anim at per se est causa deloctationis; secundario
vero est causa gaudii. liumquam en1m aliquid apprehensum. facit
gaudlum, nisl inquantum aestlmatur ut conjunctum vel eanjunglbile secundum rem ad faoiendanl delectationemj et ideo conjunetio perfectlonis primo et per se facit deloctationem; sed
inquantum apprehenditur ut delectationem faciens, tacit gaudium etiam quando delectationem actualiter non causat; undo
delactatlo naturaliter prior est gaudio."3 0
The basts of this distinction between joy and pleasure, then, is
the way in which a good object 1s in the possession of a being.

If

the object is really present and lcnown throU[:",fl the exterior senses,
pleasure will be experienoed.

30 I b =h.<:!., ad 2.

If an acquired or acquirable object
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is estimated to be a suitable good for the being or some of its
facul ties by the ill 0.081 tat iva or the intellect or both, joy will
be experienced.

Therefore pleasure is oaused by the operations of

th.e exterior senses and joy is caused by the operations of the interior senses and the intellect when these facultios are in contaot
with suitable objects.

Whether St. Thomas here means to restrict

delectatio to the enjoyment of material objects cannot be said with
certitude.

But on the basis of the distinction as given it seems

that gau4ium. will be a part of every pleasant experience.

The

reason is that apprehension of a suitable object both as aoquirable
and as acquircd is a necessary oondition for pleasure. 3l
Another but very different distinction between pleasure and
joy is made in Book III of the

Conune~ta£z

2!!

~

S,ent,ence.s.

This

new distinction raises considerable diffioultIes, but it must be
'Oresented in e;iving a complete and honest sumrnary of Thomistic doctrine on pleasure in the

3~ntences.

It will also pave the way for

much of the material to be seen in the next chapter on the

12!!. Ylli-

-tate.
Up to this point the doctrine has been taken exclusively f'rom
Book IV of' the Sentences, where the t:;eneral oontext has been a disoussion of' beatitude.

This new distinction between pleasure and

3lNobla maintains, and correctly it seems to the writer, that
pleasure a.nd joy always involve one another, a.t least in som.e small
degree. See H.-D. Noblo, O.P., "Le plaisir at 1& joie,« aSPT" V
(19ll), 706.
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joy oocurs in Book III where st. Tho:;tas treats of the human defeots
~hioh

Christ took upon Himself when He assumed a hU':lan nature.

In

iistinotion 15, question 2, artioles 1 and 3, Thomas discusses
whether the body of Christ was able to suffer and whether He experienced aotual pain in His senses.
sense pleasure (delectatio

It should be noted that only

~ensibilis),

is here distinguished from joy.

not pleasure in genoral,

The distinction is based on a oom-

lParison of pleasure with pain and of joy wi ttl SOl"ro\V.

The way must

!be prepared by a few short quotations, as follows.
ItThe impression left in the oonoupisoible part from the presenoe of good is oalled pleasure or joy; but the presenoe of evil
is oalled sorrow (tristitia) or pain (qolo,r).

How sorrow and pain

differ has been indicated above in distinotion

15.

Sense pleasure

and joy differ in the same way."3 2
Before turning to distinction

15, the following notes on the

nature of sense pleasure will be helpful.

"Sense pleasure is

oaused by the possession of something suitable by the senses. • • •
Complete sense pleasure is only in the perception of the sense of
touch, just as pain is in its woundlnc. n33
Now for the distinction between sorrow and pain, Which is the
same as the distinction between joy and sense pleasure.

"Because

32la III ~., 26, 1, 3 sol.
33.!lli.., d. 15, 2, 3, sol. 1. "De1ectatio sensibilis causatur
ex oonjunotions convenientis secundum sensum. • • • Com.plete deleoltatio sensibilis est in sola perceptione tactus, siout dolor in
laesione ejus. t1
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rain beGins in wounding and is terminated in the porception of the
sense of touoh, pain is there completed; but sorrow begins in apprehension and is terminated in appetency; therefore pain is in the
sense of touoh as in a subject, but sorI'OW is in the appetite.
'Rrom this it is clear that sorrow is a psyohioal passion, but pain
is a bodily passion."34
Aocording to this distinction, sense pleasure is a bodily passion (passio

cOrporal~,s),

is in the

sens~

as in a subjeot, and Is

caused when the senses, especially the sense of touoh, come into
contact with 8. suitable good.

Joy is a psychical passion (28.s8io

anim.ali8), is in the appetites as in a subject, and begins with
iapprehension and terminates in appetency.
Up to this time, Thomas has conSistently said that pleasure
~elongs

to the appetites, but here we find him stating that sense

pleasure belongs to apprehensive powers, the five exterior senses.
[rhere seem to be two possible explanations why St. Thomas here says
that sense pleasure is in the senses as in a subjoot.The first
~ould

be that every faculty has a "natural appetite" to perform its

pwn particular operation.

'rhus it is said that the eye, ror exam-

ple, has a natural tendency to see.

When

Ii

perfect operation of

Vision takes place, pleasure crowns that operation "siout quaedam
superveniens finis.

tt

Therefore tho sense of Sight might be looked

upon as tho seat of pleasure, the natural complement of its

-

.34Ibid., sol 2.

O\fn
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por~ect

operation.

The second possible explanation would be to interpret this
new distinction as follows: delactatio sonsibilia will arise when
the operation of one or more of the exterior senses is the formal
pause of a pleasant experience; eaudiutil will arise when the opera~ions

of the other apprehensive powers are the formal oauso of

pleasure.
~ion,

The following passage seoms to support this interpreta-

for it refers to sense pleasuro as belonging to the exterior

pensea.

"[G]audio opponitur directo tristitia.; delectationi autem

ppponit~

dolor, secundum quod delectatio est in sensu exteriori,

at pl"a.eoipue in tactu; sed seaundum quod est interiu8, non habet
~liqu1d

oppositum quam tristit1wm: posaot tamen habere, s1 asset

nomen positum.n 35

Mention is here made of another kind of pleasure

besides

sensib1l1a.

~electatio

No name is civen to it, but some

idea of its nature can be gained from the following passage.
tr[SJicut delectatio distingultur a gaudiO, ita dolor a. tristitia,
~t

sic per oppositum trlstltia. respondeat gau4io, dolor varo deleo-

~ationi:

sed quia dolor propria accipitur in sensu, at praecipue in

sensu tactus: deleetatio etiam proprie loquendo se extendit ad in~erlores

vires; ideo delectationi non solum dicimus opponi dolorem,

sed etiam trlstltiam. n )6

This second kind or pleasure, then, ex-

tends to the interior apprehensive powers, presumably to the opera-

35!!!

IV

~ •• 49, 3,

1, sol.

36 Ibld~, a. 3. sol. 1 ad 3.

-

h

ad ,3.
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tions of the interior senses and possibly even of the intellect.
It is opposed to sorrow, while sense pleasure is opposed to pain.
Thus there seems to be a sound basis for the interpretation that
sense pleasure arises when the operation ot: one or more of tho
exterior senses is the formal cause of a pleasant experience, and
this interpretation t:urnishes a plausible explanation why St.
Thomas says that aense pleasure is in the exterior senses as its
subject instead of in the appetite.
For all that, it must be admitted that the ditt:iculty is not
tully solved.
Book III of the

This now distinction betwoen ploasu.l'e and joy in
SenteI'l;oe.~

lacks clarity and precision.

Sinoe this

particular point is going to undergo considerablo development in

-

the De ...;...;...;;;...;;..:-..Veritate, it soems best to postpone further conSideration
of it until the next chapter.
Now that the nature and causes of pleasure have been treated,
some attention must be g1ven to the necessary cond1tions of pleasure.

They are two in number and have already been ment1oned.

First, the operation which is the formal and efficient cause must
be an unlimpeded operation.

This means that it must be free from

internal and external hindrances and acoording to nature or it ntay
not afford ploasu:r>e at all.
The second oondi tion 1s Imowledge.
knowledge is l""equired

i'OI'

In a very basic sense

pleasure, for only a beine endowed with

the power of COGnition can expel"ience pleasure.

This is almost

obvious, for only oognitive beings have appetite and pleasure

49
belonGs to appetite. 3?

YUlowledge is also required rrom W10ther

point of view, as an exa.mplo will show.
Sl.l!!l

of money in his pocket..

A man may have a lal"ge

This is surely a good really in his

possession, but if he does not know he has the money it will give
~im

no pleasure at all.

This is true of any

~onum oonvenie~ ~

-iLll1ctllIl?-i it must be known as really possessed before it Will be
e. source of pleasure.

St. Thomas expresses it this way.

n[Clum

leleotatio sit in appetitu, et omnis passio vel operatio appetitus
praeexigat apprehensionern; oportet quod bonum conjunotum quod de-

~ectationem causat, sit apprehensum. n38
Little notice is given to the effects of pleasure in the

-

1!entary

~

the Sentonces.

are not elaborated.

-

CO~

They are m.entioned only in passing and

Some of them have been notod already.

First,

::>leasure consists in the termination of the movoment of." the appe~ite,
~ect

so that the quieting of the appetite may be considered an efof pleasure.

Seoond, operations and activities that are

~leasant are performed more diligently and attentively.39

?leasure completes and

pe~fects

Thlrd,

an unimpeded operation prooeeding

~rom a habit oOnf"ormable to nature.4 o Fourth, bodily pleasures
nay impede the use of reason beoause of the bodily changes in3?!!! I

~.,

1,

4,

sol. 1.

.!,!!IV

~.,

49, 3, 2, sol.

38El IV Sent •• 49, 3, 1, sol. 1.

[,.OIbld. ,
,-

39Ibld" , a. 3, sol. 3
a.

4,

sol. 3.

ad

3.

-In

-

I I Sent. ,

33, 1, sol.

2 ad

6.
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volved.4 1
With the presentation of tho nature, causes, conditions and
effects of pleasure as given in the
the work of Chapter I I I is finished.

C,om.~entar;z:

.£!3 the S.ent,ences,

neoause of tho length and

complexity of this chapter a summary will be helpful.

By nature, pleasure is the termination of appetitive moveTherefore it is not a passion in the ordinary sense, but be-

ment.

cause of its intimate connection wi til appeti tivo rilOVEhilont and consequent bodily ohanges it is assigned to the oategory of nassio.
From anothor point of view, pleasure is a secondary perfection
like health which perfects and oompletes natural and unimpeded
operations.
Natural, unimpeded operations proceeding from habits are the
formal

oaus~

of pleasure since they are its proper object and spec-

ify the pleasure to be of one kind rathor than another.

The opera..

tions themBelves are speoified by a suitable good (bgnwn

~onveni

,2£!), so the suitable good might be called the remote formal cause

of pleasure.

The efficient cause of pleasure is these same unim-

peded operations, but oonsidered now as the means through which a
being comes into contact with w1d possesses suitable goods, and
upon which pleasure follows as a natural complement and seoondary
perfection.

Under this aspeot the suitable good oan be oa.lled the

remote effioient cause.
4llg IV ~.,

Or t taldnc the two efficient causes to-

49, 3, 5,

sol. 1 ad

4.
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cether, the good object could be called the causa.. guaa and the
of)eration the

ca~~

qua.

Since it is already in the order of fi-

nality, pleasure does not nood a final cause, but tho suitable bood
may be looked upon as the final cause, for it moves a being to
place those

opel~ation::J

which will put it in possession of the Good

and quiet the appetites.

It is Interestinp't:" to note that the suit ..

able good is at once the final, !"cmote formal, and remote efficient
cause of pleasure.
Knowledge was seen to be a necessary £sndition for pleasure i
two ways.

First, a good !llust be known before it can arouse the

appetl tes; second, after a Cood has

CO:i18

into the possession of a

being the fact of possession must be known befol"'e pleasure will be
experienced.

Of course, either of these acts of cognition can be

the operation which is both the formal and efficient cause of
pleasure.
Two distinctions between pleasure and joy were conSidered, but
no definite conclusion could be reached.

Finally, two conditions

and four effects of pleasure were montioned.

Now it is time to

turn to the 12!! Voritato, the second of the foul" primary sources.

CllAPT.BR IV
PLEASURE Dr THE DE

Pleasure is treated :Ln the

.!2.!

tled "The Passions of the Soul"

y:ER:t~A TE

Veritate in question 26, enti-

Of the ten articles in this ques-

tion, the fourth and the fifth treat pleasure more specifically.
The fourth article asks, "On What Grounds A'J.'o the Contrariety and
~iversity

among the Passions of the Soul Based?" and the fifth

asks, "Are Hope, Fear, Joy, and Sadness the
of the Soul?"l

POUl"

Principal Passions

In read1n3 over these two articles one is lead to

ask, "Why 1s joy so frequently mentioned and numbored among the
~assions,

while pleasure receives

con~)aratively

little notice?"

The answer to this question goos back to the difficult distinction between pleasure and joy in Book III of tho Sentences
Iwhich was discussed in the last chapter.

In that distinction, it

will be remembered that ploasure was compared to pain and joy to
sorrow, and pleasure and joy were said to be distinct in the same

1Thomas Aquinas, Truth, III, trans. Robert "VV. Schmidt, S.J.,
(Chicago, 1954), pp. 261 and 267. This work will hereaftor be referred to as Truth with the appropriate question and article numbers followinc_ 'This translation has bean chosen in preference to
older Latin editions ot the De Ver1tate because it was made trom
the detinitive Leonine text. -The writer has constantly referl"·ed
to the 8th (Sp1azzi) edition of the ~ Veritate as an aid 1n interpretation.
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way that pain and sorrow are distinct.

This was seen to mean that

pleasure is a bodily passion, belongs to apprehensive powers (the
five exterior senses), not to appetite, and is oompleted in apprehension.

Joy, on the other hand, was said to be a psychical pas-

sion, is in the apnetites as its subject, and begins with apprehonsian and

tel~rninates

in the operation of tho appetites.

identical doctl"ine is contained in the section of tho

Almost
~

Vori tate

now undor considoration, as the following two passages will make
clear.

The first passage reads as follows.

"In its strict sense

pain should not be numbered among tho passions of the soul, because
it involves nothing on the part of the soul beyond mere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but the injury itself
is in the body.

!i'or this reason even AugustIne adds in the same

place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than
lPain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself. n2
It is to be noted that pain is not a passion because it involves
~othing

beyond apprehension, but sadness is completed in the appe-

ti ti 'Ie power i teelf •

'rhomas goe s on to say in the vOr"J next para-

graph:
Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and
pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body
union with something a[irooablo, and on the part of the soul
the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual
pleasure involves a certain real uIlion of two. things that
agree with each other, and the perception of this union.
Thus in defininc~ sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is

Zrruth, 26,

4,

ad

4.

See also q. 26, ), ad

9.

a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in ceneral, said that pleasure is the unhampered
operation of a habit conformable to nature. For an agreeable
o?el:'at1on 1s that un! ted agreeable thing which causos pleasul'e, espeCially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasupo of either
kind begins with real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, bogins with apprehension and ends in the
affections. 3
The key words here of course are: "Thus pleasure of either kind begins wttth a real union and is completed in its apprehonsion.
~owever,

Joy,

begins with apprehension and ends in the affections."

Since pleasUJ:'e is completed in apprehension, it cannot be a passion
for in the next article Thomas says clearly that the passions are
in the sense appetitive part of the soul and mentions joy as one of
tho four pI'\incipal passions.4

Small wonder that pleasure gets

li ttle notice in this tl"eatment of tho passions of the soul, then,
IWhile joy 1s prominently mentioned.
It will be remembered that Thomas hesitated to call pleasure a
passion in the strict sonse in the Com.mentar;z .2!!
for a much different reason.

Sen~ence~,

but

In the Sentences pleasure is said to

consist in the termination of appetitive
tho essential note of motion.

2.

move~l1ent,

and thus to lack

But hore in the -De Voritate
........Dleas-

ure is not called a passion bocause it does not; belong to the appetitive part of the soul at all, but to the a.pprehensivo.

This doc-

trine wa.s clearly foreshadowed in the distinction between joy and
pleasure found in Book III of the Sente.l1oes and outlined above.

3Truth, 26,
db

......

4 Ib1d., a.

h,

ad

5.

5, pri~.

See also q. 26, 3, ad 11.
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In the previous chapter tho wrlter attempted to solve the difficulty by appealing to the natul"al tendency or "natural apDotlte"
that each faculty has to place its own particular operat:ton.

When

an unhampored onoration occurs, pleasure completes and porfects
that operation.

Therefore, the five extern.al senses mif'ht be

looked upon as the source or pleasure when they perform unhampered
operations, and this may be what Thor:las means when he says that
sense pleasure is completed in apprehension.

Joan Lanclois, S.J.,

takes a vory similar a'01'roaoh in his attempt to put senso pleasure
back into the appetites.
Le bien et Ie mal sont objet de l'appetit. La presence
du bien engendre le plaisir, celle du mal, .la douleur. Quand
u~ sens per90it un objet qui lui est proportionn6, et qui,
des lors, constltuo un bien pour lui et pour tout l'individu,
il se produit une react~on dans l'appetit: o'est le plaisir.
Da.'1S un sons tout a fait equlvoqu.o, de meme que It on
narle d'amour "naturel," l'on pourralt parler de delectation
"naturelle" pour desi£nor l'etat de 1a faculte COGnitive lors
qu'elle a per9u un objet proportionne • • • • . La sensation est
dans la raculte de coru1alsanoe,~mais.le plaisir au la douleur sont dans.l'appetit. Voila pourquoi Joan de SalntThor:ms apports cette .p:r-oclsion: "[Sensus oxternus] tristatur
vel delectatur de sua cQgnit:tone non formaliter, Id enlm pertlnot ad ap1:)etitum, sed objective, quia. de tali cO,gnitione ut
de objecto ~ppetitusr:'laetatur." (£ura. Phil., T. III, ad.
Reiser, p. 248 b 25)~
st .. Thomas seems to leave himself open to this interpretation when
he says, "Sensible ploasure involves on the part of tho body union
wi th something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling

~aval

5Jean LangloiS, 8.J., "La definition de 1a delectation,"
Theologique at Philosophique, V, (191+9), 181+.

56
Iof this agreeableness. tt6
The writer made another attempt to explain how sense pleasure
!Could belong to the sense appetites by saying that sense pleasure
arises in tho appetite when the operation of one or more of the
oxterior senses is the formal cause or pleasure.

Thomas's doc-

trine here in the Q! Veritate seems to admit of this interpretation; for he says, "Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real
union and is completed in its apprehension.

Joy, however, begins

with apprehension and ends in the affections."

His oonolusion from

this in the very next sontenoe is: "Thus pleasure is sometimes the
~ause of joy, just as pain is sometimes tho cause of sadnoss.n7
~

way is here opened for getting pleasure back into the appetite;

ror if pleasure oauses joy, then the act of apprehension in which
pleasure consists is the cause of movement in the appetite.

Thomas

~ays

ear11er in this same passage: "For an agreeable operation 1s

~hat

united

~tual
~ct

~n

af~oeable

pleasure."

thing which oauses pleasure, especially spir-

The agreeable operation in this ca.se would be the

of apprehension.

It will be remembered that Thomas also said

the Sentenoes that ag:r.·eeable opcl"'atlons are, under different

~spects, both the formal and effioient causes of pleasure. 8

6Truth, 26, 4,

ad 5. The passace is quoted in full on f,p. 53Tue Latin version of the rtfeelin.~ of this agroeablenoss' is
sensus illius convenlentiae.

54.

7Ib id.
BChapter III, pp. 35-38.
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The notion of spiritual pleasure in the passage just dealt
with clears up an obscurity noted in the previous chapter. 9

There

a certain unnamed kind of pleasul"e, belonging to the apprehensive
powers other than tho five exterior senses, was mentioned.

Com-

parison indicates that the deleotatio spiritualis here mentioned
und the unnar.1ed pleasure of the Sentences. are one and the same ..
[Iho

reason is that both are psychical

sions, and are

so,~lehow

passions, not bodily pas-

involved in the opol"ations of tl1e apprehen-

sive powors other than the five exterior senses.
'rurninr, now to the body of ar·ticlo

4 of

ques·tion 26, we find

a threefold distinction in the passions of the soul_

The second

pf the three distinctions is that by which the passions a1"e distinguished in species within the sarne power.
~re

Two different bases

given for the distinction: fil"st, according to contrariety of

pbjocts; second, "aocording as the conoupiscible power is referred
in different ways to tho same object, or in other words aocording

:to the different stages that can be considel'ed in the course of an
anpetitive movement. 1f
~lar

The plaoe assigned to eaudium Is of partio-

interest.
For the pleasurable object Is first united psyollically with
the l~an who se€)l~s it, by beine: approhended as like him or agreeable to him. From this th.ere follows the passion of love,
which is nothing but the speCifIcation of the appetite by the
form of the appetlble object. • • • But what has thus been
united psychically is sought further with a view to its being
united really, so that the lovel~ enjoys tho possession of the
beloved. Thus is born the paSSion of desire, Which, when the

9S ee Chapter III, pp.

47-48.

58
objeot has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first
staGe, then, in the movement of the conoupisoible power is
lovo; the seoond, desi.re; and the last, joy.l0
It is to be noted that joy

arise~

when the object has been obtained

in reality, that is, when I'eal union has been established and the
arpeti to quieted. 11

In the Conrnentary' 2E: ~ §..ontencos this last

stare in the appetl ti ve movc:-nont was called deleotatio, pleasure. 12
It is almost as though Thomas has substituted joy for pleasure in
ithe De Veritate.

This m.ight \ye11 be "'hat happened, for Thomas

lolds in the Q!! y"eritate that pleasure is not a passion or a movenent of the appetite, as has been seen.

Joy seems to be the only

other term that could have been used.
In support of this contention the body of the fifth artiole
oan be oited.
Now joy and sadness come from the attainL~ont o£ cood or evil,
a.nd that essentially; £or joy comes from a Good inasmuch as
it is good, ruld sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is
evil. And all the other passions of the concupiscible power
likewise come from Good 01" evil essentially. • • • Yet'the
other passions of the concupiscible po\ver presuppose joy and
sadness as their cause; for a good beco~es loved and desi~ed
by the concupiscible by x'eason of its boine apprehended as
pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by belOTruth, 26, L~ c.
llAt first Glanco there might seem to be a contradiction here,
for in Truth, 2,f), L~ ad 5 Tho;;1as says thut ~loasul"e be::::ins with
rea,l unIon while .J..2;i begins with app:pohons~on. But thore does not
soem to be any reason why tho very appreh.ension w:1ich terr::dnates
pleasure cannot be tho sar,lO ono wlth which joy berins. In this explanation, joy would still be the last stage in appetitive movement, though pleasure would be prior- by nature. On thi s point soe
the passaZe fl-'om the Sontences quoted on p. }~3 of t~lis thesis.
121!! IV ~ .. ,

49, 3. 1, sol. 1. See p. 30 of this thesis.
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ing approhended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetonoy
joy and sadness are pl"lol"', thou£:,;h in the o:;....der~ of execution
and attainment they are posterior. 1 3
.
Joy, then, is first in tho order of appetency, but last in the

01"-

aer of oxeoution and attain::lont; or, in tho languaGo of artiole

4.,

it is "the last stage in the movement of tho concupiscible power."
A01"oover, it enjoys a positIon of natural priority, fOl" the other
)assion3 of the concupisoiblo power which have e;ood as their objeot
presuppose joy as their cause.
A

position opposed to this was held in tho Sentences,
... as the

('0110w1n8 quotation vlill show.

"Pleasure and joy have the same

oause, but not in the same order; for first and essentially it is
the oause of pleasure; secondarily it is the cause of joy.

For

something that has been apPl"ehended nevor causes joy except as it
is krlOwn to be really unitod or unitable in itself to cause pleasurej and thorefore the attaining of a perfeotion first and essen-

tinIly causes pleasure; but in so far as it is apprehended as oaus~nt:

pleasure, it causes joy even when it is not actually causing

pleasure; therefore ploasure is naturally prior to joy."14
~hat
~oy

Hote

in this quotation pleasure is first in the order of appetenoy"

is relegated to a secondary position and is not one of the four

tprincipal passion.s as it is in the

~ Veritat~.

Although it is not

!explioitly stated that pleasure is last in the ordel' of exeoution

13Truth, 26,

5

o.

14m rv ~., 14-9.

3, 1, sol.

~his passage will be found on p.

43

4

ad 2. The Latin version of
of this thesis.
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and attainxnent, this ha.s beon noted in nutnerous pass8.f;es from tho
S,entences already considoxe od. 15
the

~

The point to be notod is that in

Vel"itate joy sooms to have the place occupiod by ploasure in

the Son;tenc,es.
Two coclparativoly minor points remain to be considered in the
~

Verltate..

The first concerns the notion of "pre-delectation"

mentioned in tho previous chapter. l6
in the

~ Ve.rita~~

Thomas touchos on this point

when he says that the movement of tho concupis-

cible and irascible powers can be

considEn~od

namely, in desiring and in executinc..

in two respects,

In deslring, "tho concupis-

cible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the
pleasurablo object.,,17

now "moved to enjoyment" seems to indicate

that theI'e is a kind of ttprelirll1nary pleasure If in the appoti to even
before the actual possession of the good object.

:Jore definite

information on this point will be found in -tho chaptel" on the

~urnlna

Theolo£:io.e.
The last point oonoerns pleasure of the intellect and is found
in the reply to an objection.1B

The burden of the objeotion is

that passions in the strict sense, vii th their essential note of
contrariety, are in the intellect.

Thomas solvos the difficulty

l5,!a IV ~., It9, 3, 1, sol. 1.
16Chaptor III, p.

1!! III ~., 27 J I, 2, ad 3

34.

17~ruth, 25, 6, ad 3. "Sed concupisoibilis, ad solB.b'l apprehensionem deloctabilis, movetur ad f:-uitionem dolectabllis."

18 Ibid ., 3, ad 6.
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pJ'" distinguishing between tho act of lJnderstanding and the thing
lUderstood.

Intellectual pleasure is caused by the union of the

ntelloet and a suItable intelli?;ible object through an intolligi)le species; that is, by an act of undcrstandinr:.
)ontra1""'J to an intolli:.:::ible speoies,
L.ral"'ies are not contrf:u'Y in the soul.

rOJ'

But nothing is

even the species of con-

The!:'efore, from the view-

)oint of tilO act of undo:;:>sturldlng, t.horo can be no contl'·ary passion
n tho intellect and plea::mre will necessarily follow. 1 9

But broadly speakinr;, sadno3s or pain can be said to be in the
ntolloct when tho intclleot undc:;:tstands something as harIni'ul, to
"hich the will is avorao..

t'Bocause that har!:1ful thine, howeveI', is

lot harmful to the intellect as
~s

undc!l:~standinv

it, sadness or pain

not contrarUyopposed to the delight of the intellect, which

~o:'1es

from understandinc something sui table to the intellect in

80

F-ar a.s it undcl:>stands. n20
In this reply there is nontioned a third kind of pleas1.U'O,
~electatio intellectua.lis, which follows upon the act of under~tanding
~ooks

considered as an unhampered operation.

Obviou:Jly, Thomas

upon intelleotual pleasure as a croVininG secondary perfection

pf the intellect, the act of undol"st:1nding beine the pl"'imary pel"'f;>ection.
With this tho oonsideration of pleasure in the De Veritate is

19Por almost identical doctrine see

sol. 2.

20Truth, 26, 3, ad 6.

1.£

IV ~.,

49, 3, 3,
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finished.

Pleasure in the COfllf'1entary on the

ill be tho subject of the next chapter.

IUoornaoh~a.Q

Ethios

CHAPTER V

PLEASURE IN THE C OM!1!EN~AIiX ON

!!!!

ETHIC S

Sinoe this ohapter will study St. Thomas t s doctT'ine on pleasure in one of his Al"istotolian cOr:1.:'aentaries, it will be well to
preface a fow remari{s about his intention and method in these commentaries.
v1here intention is concerned, it soe;:15 clear that Thomas meant
primal~ily

to expound the work of Aristotle..

If one consults any of

the com.nentaries, he finds a careful, even a painstaking division,
analysis, and exposition of the Aristotelian text.

Secondary sour-

cos call attention to an important point of extrinsic evidence,
Inamely, contemporary history.l

At the tirno Thomas wroto most of

his Aristotelian commentaries, Aristotlets works were suspect and
under hoavy fire from Christian theolol:ians and scholars at Paris
and oven from the Pope.

Introduced to the WOl"ks of Aristotle by

St. Albert, who was the first great Christian cOr:l:r!ontator on the
Stagyrite, Tho:uas recognized how valuable Aristotle could be in
building a truly Christian philosophy.

He wanted to pr'eservo Aris-

lThonas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros MetaPh~siCOrUrl1 Aristotelis
Exposltl0, ad. Haj'lllondSplazzl, 6.p., [TurIn, 1 50), xvi-xvIII.
.
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totlo from false interpretation, especially the Averroistic, and
from consequent papal conderri1lation.

To do this he chose the sound-

est and l.'lost Insting way. wri tini:~ cru"oful and accurate corn.;ilentariea
to expound Aristotle's work COl"rectly.

Thus fI'ora both internal and

external evidence, it seems ClCD.l" that St. Thor:tas l s intention is to
expound the text of Aristotle carefully and correctly.
ii.

few words will suffice on St. Thomas's method in these oom-

mentaries.

They are all literal expositions of Latin translations

of Aristotle.

Speaking of the comrnentary on the

Ivo

~ Anl~a,

Thomas says: "It cannot be too clearly emphasized that the Comm.entary is only what it calls itself, an exposition of a text.

It is

that even before being an exposition of what is said in the text;
that perhaps more than an exhaustive assertion of what in detail
the com.:'1lcntator held to be the truth."2
St. Thomas's standard procedure is something like this.

Each

loctio or main division he[,1ns by showing the place within the
whole work of tho passaGo under lrnnodiato consideration.

The pas-

sage is then logIcally dividod and subdivided down to s;:aall phl'ases
Only aftor this formal analysis of the text has been. made does St.

Tho!ilaS go on to oxplain the material contained in it.

Thus it is

clear that his method is in full accord with his intention to ex-

2Aristotle t s De Anir.la in the Vel~sion of William of Moorbeke
and the COtllr:lGntaryof 'St; Thomi."SAquillas, trans. Kenelrii Foster;o.P.--arid Silvester Hurnpnl~iea, b.p. (London, 1951), Introd., pp. 13-

14.

.ound clearly and aoourately the text of Aristotle.
When this has been said, the question naturally arises, "Can
these commentaries be looked upon as sources of 'rhomistic Joctl"lno,
or does St. Thomas confine himself strictly to expound.inG Aristotle?"

The Aristotelian corrunentaries are far from beinG the richest

sourcos of' Thomistic doctrine, but neither are they oompletely bar'''en.

They must be read carefully to asoertain when Thomas is ex-

ounding Aristotle, when he is explaininG or quoting Aristotle with
approval. and when he is giving his own doctrine.

In preparing

"his fifth ohapter, the writer has tried oarefully to distinguish
etwoon these throe levels and to present what seems to be Thomas's
wn doctrine.
A final preliminary consideration is this.

The present chap-

er doa1s with St. Thomas f s comL1Emtury on the N'iool:lacllean I\thios.
t onco, therefore, we are in an ethioal context.
~eep

It is well to

this in mind, for even when he speaks of the natm."'e of pleas-

re Thomas's basic viewpoint will not be metaphysical or psychologcal, but ethical.
In tho Nicomaohean Ethics pleasure oomos in fo::.... discussion in
several places, as follows: in Book I, where the questions relating
o happiness are raised; in Book II, ohapter' ), \,hEH'e the nature
f good acts and virtue is under exunlna.tion; in Book III, chapter

9, in connection with the virtue of temperance; in Dook VII, chapers 11 to

14,

where continenoe and inoontinence are treated; and

in Book X, chapters 1 to 8, whel"O tho natm."'e of pleasuro and its
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relationship to happiness are discussed.
impo~tant

The most extended and

passages are in Book VII and Book X, which will be ana-

lyzed here, but with regard for the other seotions.
In the very beginning of Book X St .. Thomas gives us one of
those very helpful guideposts which looks both forward and backward.

It reads as tollows.
Et dicit quod post praedlcta consequens est, ut pertranseunter, idest breviter, de delectationo tractetur. Tractavorat quidem supra in septimo de deleotatione, inquantwn est
rnateriae continentiae. Unde ibi potissime sua consideratio
versabatur oiroa deleotationes sensibiles at oorporales. Nuno
autem intendi t detcn'>cllinare de deleotatione seclL'1dur!1 quod adjungitur tellcltati. Et ideo praeQlpue determinat de delootatione intelligibili et splrituali • .5

With tho way thus pointed out, we turn to Book VII, Where censideration is given ohiefly to sonse pleasure.
It will be remembered from the first chapter that Plato held
that all pleasures involvo cenGl"'ation or becoming, and therefore
are nei thol" e:ood nor fully peal.

To answer Plato, Aristotle m.alws

an important distinction that St. Thom.as explains a.nd approves.4
!Iot all pleasures, he says, are generations or involve genel'ations.

Those that do involve generation ax'e the aots which are oonstitutive of habits, but there are also pleasurable oporations.
Operations are more perfect than the habits from Which they
proceed.

Habits must be acquired by repeated aots and, onoe formeq

3Thomas AqUinas, In DeoGr:1 IJiln'os 't.i!thlcoI'UIn Aristotelis ad
Hioomachum Expos.i,tio, acr. it. 'lif. Plrotta, O.P. TTurin, !949),-X, 1,

n. 1954.

4!g VII

~., 12,

nne

1483-93.

eive rise to operations.

For this reason habits are called first

perfections, while the operations proceeding fl"Orll them are called
second perfections.

It is true that the acts which form a habit

nay be pleasul"able, but tilis is only a.ccidental.

These acts oon-

stitutive of habits a.rc the generations of which Plato spoke, but
even they participate in good because they are ordered to the fornation of first perfections or habits.

To sum up in the words of

st. Thomas: "Sic ergo vera et pOl' sa deleotationes sunt i11ae quae
aunt circa oporationes pr'ocedontos ox habl tibus, seu naturis at
!t:ormis jam oxistentibus.

Il1ae autem delectationes quae Bunt con-

stitutivae habituum et nat1.u"arum, non sunt vcrc et siIupliciter dolectationes, sod

pOI'

accidcns."5

Aristotle goes on to forlilulate a definition of pleasul'e to rer,p1ace Plato's faulty definition, which r'cads: tfDelectatio ost qua.edam sensibilis goneratio in naturam. n6 Plato's de.finition will fit
only those accidentally pleasurable acts which a.re constitutive of
li:labits.

A definiti9n must be formulated which will include true

~leasures,

those which a1'>iso from operations proceeding from habits.

Tho definition finally formulated and its explanation is as follows.
Delectatio eat operatio non imEedi ta habi tus qu~, est secundum
n'aturam, Ideat'
-naturae habontis cona:rult. Impedimentum'
autonl oporation s c.llff'icultatom causat fn operando, quae deloctationom exolud1t. Ideo aut em quibusdam visum est quod delectatl0 sit generatio quaedam, quia delectatl0 cst cil"ca 1d
quod est principallter bonum, idest oirca operatlonem quam ex-

ru:t:

r.:
':}In VII

~.,

12, n. lLl-8B.

6~., 11, n. 1474.
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istlmant esse idem. generationi, cum tamen non sit ielonl, sed
aliquid postorius.. Nam c;oneratio est via in natJ,l.ram. Operatio autem est usus naturalls tormae aut habitus.'
.
This definition olearly puts pleasure in the order of finality because true pleasures have to do only with unhindered operations,
which are seoondary perfeotions proceeding from habits.
important question must be asked about the definition.

But one
Is pleasure

the unhindered operation itself, or is it caused by the operation?
The following passage, taken from tho next lesson,

thl~OWS

some

light on tho point.
[U]niuscujusque habitus aunt oporationes aliqua.o non impoditae. Felicitas autem est operatio non impodita vel omnilun
bonorum. habituum, vel alic,jus eorum, • •• [,~juia operatio
non impodit.a est felleitas, at hoc etiam delectationem ca.usat,
inde est quod omnes existimant vitam folicem esse delectabilem
Et rationabl11ter adjungunt) delectatlonera fellcltati. Quia
nulla operatio perfecta. cst 1m.ped.ita. Felicitas autern est
perfectum bonum. • • ~ Unde est operatio non impedita, quia
delectationem causat.o
What 3eom3 to be said here is that unhindeI'ed 0pol'ations give rise
to happiness (fellcitas),9 and happiness in turn oauses pleasure.
But full clarification of this point will have to wait until Book X
is taken up.
Before turning to Book X, one important passage concerning the
cause of pleasure should be oonsidered.

This passaGe occurs in

Book III, lesson 19, where Aristotle deals with tempera..'1ce.

The

7Ibid., 12, n. 11t93.

8~bi.?-., 13, nn. 1505-06.
9 In I Eth., 10, n. 130, felic! tas is defined as opol"atio 121"'0pria hOmtnissecundU!l! v.1rtutem 1a ~ Eerfoct.~.

passage is lone;, but it merits full quotation.
Distinguit deleotatlones. Et dicit quod oar~~quaedam
aunt animales, quaedam corporales. Corporalos quidem. delectationes aunt, quae consummantur in quadam corporali passione
exterioris sensus. Anlmales autem delectationes aunt quae
consummantur ex sola apprehensione interiori. Et exempliflcat
de delectationibus anirnalibus, incipions a causa de1ectationis
quae est ar:or. Unusquisque cnlm dolectatur ex hoc quod habet
ill quod amat. InvenituI' autem in quibusda.rn amor honoris, et
in quihusdam arnor disciplinae, quae non apprehenduntur exterlol~i sensu, sed intoriori aporebonsione a.nlmae.
Unde uterque
sorum, scilicet et illo qui est amator honoriS, at ille qui
est al11a.tor Jisciplinae, gaudet per id quod amat, dura scilicet
habet ipsum.. Et hoc gaudium non fit per allglJ,em corporis paaaionem, sed por sola.m apprehensioncll1 mentis. IV
In this

passaC~e

we find first a distinction between bodily and psy-

chical pleasures.

The basis of tho distinction is tIle way in which

the two types of pleasure arIse, bodily pleasures by movement of
the exterior senses, psychical pleasures by interior apprehension
alone.

V/hat is lil0ant by interior approhension is shown by two ex-

amples in which abstr'act things like honor and order are desired.
rrhe cause of pleasure is desire, for a man is pleased because he

gets possession of what he desires.
they

l~ejolce

when they attain it.

podily change, but

fl~om

now some lUon de:Jire honor, and
This joy does Ylot arise from a

the mind's u..'1derstanding that honor has

boen won.
It should be noted that desire is said to be a cause of pleasure, and that pleasure &.:I:'ises when the desired good is actually
possessed, presumably thl--ollgh suitable unimpeded activity on the
physical or sonse level.

But joy (saudium) doos not arise from

lOla III ~., 19, n. 600.
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[bodily change, but from mental apprehension.

St. Thomas seems to

present here a third doctrine of the difference betweon pleasure
and joy.

He

soems to indicate that suitable unimpeded activity on

the physical or sonse level gives rise to pleasure, and that like
activity on the rational level gives

l~ise

to joy.

Clarification

and confirmation of this ,?oint will be noted in the next chapter.
Now our attention must be turned to Book X, where St. Thomas
Ibocins by saying, tlN"unc autem IntencU t detorminare de delectatione
secundum quod adjunc:1 tur follcl tat1.

Et ideo pl'>aecipue determlnat

de doloctationo intelligibili €It spirituali.«ll

In tho very beginning of Book X the following interestinG
statement occurs.

ttpraocipue enim consistit virtus moral is. in or-

dinatione appetitus, quae cognoscitur

pOI"

ordlnationeln deleotatlo-

nis at trlstitiao, quae consequuntur omnes appetitivae partis motus, ut supra in sec undo dictum. est. ,,12

Pleas.ure and sadness, theq

follow all movements of the appetitive part of the soul.

The re-

:Cex'ence ms"de to Book II is worth investigation, for it clarifies
tho quotation just civen. '
Et ideo enumerando pa3sione9, dicit quod passlones aunt
conoupiscentia, quam nominarnus desideriu,'11, et ira, et timor,
at audacia, et invidia quae contlnetur sub tl"'>istitia, at
gaudium quod continetur sub delectatione, est 8nim dalectatio
non corporalia, Dod intoriori apprehensione cOllsistens: €It
a.m.icitla, €It odium., et desiderium.. Quod differt a concupiscentia: 00 quod concupi9centia ent delectationis corpol"alis,
desiderlum 8utem cujusllbet altoI'ius delectabilis . . . . .
Addit autam quod universalitcr ad or:mia praedicta sequi-

Ill.!! X _th., 1, n.
12Th., d
n
1 qc6

1954.
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tur delectatio et trlstitia; quia omnia. alia importa.nt motus
quosda'll in bonum et nal Url, ex quoru.m su.pcrventu causa tur dolectatio vel tristitia. Undo omuss aliae passionos terminantur ad dolectatlonom ot t;pistitiam. 1 3
Tho chief point to be noted Is that ploasu:;:>e and sadness follow
upon all the passions hor'o .,:,lEmtioned.

Tho roason is that all these

passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good and
evil, and the attalnrnent of the good desb'cd or evil feared is the
cause of pleasul"e and sadness.
t~rminated

Therefol""e all the passions are

in oi thor pleaStll"O or sadness.

It sooms tilat pleasure

and sadness are themselves passions, for Thomas says OI¥1ef!,

~liae

:Q.asniones.
Anothor point to be noted is that delectatlo is here ::lade the
generic torm and

~audium.

1s one or its infel:"iol'·s.

GaudiUtll is said

to be non-bodily pleasure, conSisting in interior apprehenSion of
soma good.

Further, a distinction is made between

and desl.derium.

~oncuoiscentia

Concupiscence is the paSSion which preee:les bodily

pleasure, while desire is the passion which pl"ocodes 8.11 other
pleasures.
The doctrine presented here 1s quite consistent with what has
already been seen, especially in the

SentenQ~.

Knowledge of a

good gives rise to appetitive movement toward that good.

When the

appetite finds rest in possession of the good, pleasure results.
Another inSight into the nature of pleasure is civen in lesson

3, where the Platonic dootrine is unJer discussion.

-

-

13In II Eth.,

5, nn. 291l. 296.

n[D]eleotatio
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pst passio animas.
~io

Patet ergo, quod delectatl0 non est ipsa reple-

seu generatio. sed quoddam ad hoc consequens.

Facta autem re-

pletione aliquis delectatur, sicut facta inoisione aliquis dolet et
~ristatur.ttll.t

Here again emphasis is plaoed on the notion that

pleasure is not movement, but something: consequent upon movement.
rhis notion w111 soon be developed .fully.
In lesson

5 of Book X there is a long discussion proving that

pleasure is neither motion nor generation.

The viewpoint of this

lesson is entirely negative and most of the material has already
been seen. but one passage merits quotation.

In this passage

pleasure is compared to vision, the oporation of the sonse of
si[pt.
Sed visio statim in momento perficltur. Et idem est de delectatione. Est enim deloctatio quoddam totum, ldost completum
in primo instanti quo inoipit esse, ita quod non potest aoclpi
a1iquod tempus in quo fiat delectatio, quod l"equirat arnplius
tempus ad speclem deleotationls perficiondanl, siout oontinrit
in his quorum Goneratl0 e;3t in tempol"'~h Potest enim accipl
al1quod tempus generationis h~anae. quod requirlt ampllu8 ad
speciam htunanam perfic iendam. 1 ;.,
This passage definitely recalls a parallel question in the Rommentarz .2Q

time.

1h£ Sentenoes where Thomas denied that pleasure was in

Because it consists in the terraination of appetitive move-

ment, nloasUl"e Is instantaneous and therefore outside of timo. 16
The next lesson, lesson 6. presents Aristotle's positive doo14In X Eth., 3, n. 1994.

- -

1>Ibld.,

5, nn. 2006-07.

16 In IV ~., 1t9. 3, 1, sol. 3, ad 3.
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trine on pleasure.

This is by far the fullest treatment of pleas-

ure in the Nioomaohean Ethics and the Thomistic COI!1flentary is a
~lch

source of Thomas1s own doctrine.
Aristotle begins by snowing that pleasure Is the perfection

~f

an operation.

Tho argument runs as follows.

For an operation

two things are needed, a faculty and an object of this faculty.
~he

better disposed the faculty is to eood operation and the more

suitable the object is to the faculty, the more perfect will be the
~esulting

operation.

Now experienoe testifies that the more per-

frect an operation is. the more pleasing it is, and that we experi$nce pleasure in the operations of all our senses and even of our
intelloct.

The conclusion is: "Si ergo operatio perfecta est de-

lecta.bilis. perfeotlssima autem deleetabilissima, consequens cst
quod operatio, inquantum est perfecta, sit delectabilis,

Deleeta-

tio ergo est operationis perfectio. nl7
The next step is to show how pleasure perfects the operation.
Pleasure has a role to play different from either the faculty or
the object in perfocting the operation.
oration Eel" modum
health.

forma~,

Pleasure perfects the op-

and in this respect oan be compared to

Health does not oause healing, but ratheJ:l oJ:lowns the suo-

cessful efforts of the dootor to heal a sick person.

In the words

of St. Thomas:
Siout etirun ejus quod est sanari non eodem modo est oausa.
sanitas at rnodicus; sed sanitas quideLl per modum formae, medicus autem. per modum aeontis. Sirniliter 8.utem parricit opera-

14
tionem per rnodunl quidcm forrnae deleotatio, quae est ipsa perfactio ajus, per modum autei'll aGontis parrioit ipsam sensus
bene dispoaitua siout movens motum. Senaibile autem conveniens, sicut movons non motum. Et eadem. z.atio est cix'cEl. intellactum. 1U
For'tunately, further' information is provided about the meaning
of per modum formae.

After stating that pleasure perfects the op-

eration not efficiantly but formally, Thomas distinguishes two
kinds of formal perfeotion.
the essence of a being.

The first is intrinsio and oonstitutes

The second is extrinsic and perfeots a be-

ing already constituted in its species.

Pleasure partakes of the

latter; it is a certain crowning perfection which completes an operation that has arisen from causes that arc well disposed.

To

quote st. Thomas: "(D]electatio perficit operationem non sicut

hab~

tus qui inest, idest non sicut forma intrinseca esscntiae rei, sed
sicut quldam finis, Idest quaedam perfectio superveniens, sicut pul
chritudo venit juvenibus non quasi existens de essentia juventutls,
sed quasi oonsequens bonam dispositionem causarum juventutis.

Et

similiter delectatio consequltur bonam dlsposltionem causarum operationis. tf1 9
One last point deserves note.

In discussing whether pleasure

or the operation is desired fOI" itself, St .• Thomas lets fall a definition of pleasure which seems to be entirely his own.

"For

pleasure is the repose of the appetite in the pleasing object,
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which a man haa gained poasession of throUeft an operation. n20
IAgain Thomas returns to conceiving pleasure as the repose of the
~ppetite

in an acquired good.

This does not contradict his agree ...

ing with Aristotle that pleasure Is the crowning peri'ectlon of an
~impeded

operation, but merely looks at pleasure from another

of view.

~olnt

In fact, this definition contains two notions or

views of pleasure that Thomas has been striving, whether consciously or unconsciously, to unite: the Christian Platonic "quietatio

appetltus in bono" and the Aristotelian doctrine of unhindered oporation and its crowning porfection.

These two notions are con-

tained in this one definition, but trley are still far from being
ha.rmonized and united.

That will have to wait until the mo:tts ma-

ture work of the Summa The,olo6iae.
It will be remembered that earlier in this chapter the question was :ttaised whethe:tt pleasure is an operation or is caused by
an operation. 21

From what has been seen it is clear that pleasure

is not an operation, but a formal porfection of an unimpeded operation.

But it seems that pleasure mit!Jlt be identified with the

operations of the senses and the intellect, since it is so
eon.1'1soted with the operations of those faculties.

often

This possibility

is ruled out because pleasure pertains to the appetitive part of
the soul.

In the words of St. Thomas: "Hec tamen est idem quod op-

20Ibid., n. 2038. "Nruu delectatio est quies appetitus in re
delectante, qua quia per operationem potitur."

21p. 68.

pratio intellectus, neque idem quod operfltio sensus.
~io ma.s1s

ad appetitiva.m part em pertinet.

HaM delecta-

Est autom inconvenlens

s1 deleatatio aliquibus videatur esse idem operationi, propter hoc
~uod ab opera.tions non separatur."22

In the la.st sentence the.fle

~s the interesting obser'lration that pleasure is not separate trom
~he

operation it perfects, and for this reason some have identified

Ithe two.
~

Rather than an operation .. pleasure is a.n epiginomenon,

"atter-e::f'feot," a formal perfection whioh oompletes and per1'ects

Ithose operations which proceed from proper and well disposed oau~es.

If pleasure is a formal perfection, it 1s also a perfection
~n

the order ot fina.lity, for it is a. good superadded to a being

~hat

is resting in possession 01' an acquired good.

pf st. Thomas, pleasure perfects

In the words

an operation "siout quidem flnis,

~dest quaedam pori'eotio superveniens."23

With this the work of Chapter V 18 complete.

An investigation

pr the Summa Theologiae, the fourth and final primary source, will
pe the work ot the next ohapter.

22 In X Eth., 8, n. 2054.

-

-

23Ibi~ ••

6, n. 2031

CHAPTER VI
PLEASURE IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE
Although St. Thomas

m~ntlons

pleasure several times in the

Summa Theologiae, two treatments of it stand pre-eminent.
oocur in the Prima Secundae.

Both

They aro of major importanoe because

of their length and completeness, and the faot that they treat
1P1easure directly, not just in passing.
The first is found in the treatise on the last end of man at
the very beginning of the Prima Secundae.

In the sixth article of

the seoond question Thomas asks whether m.ants happiness oonsists
in pleasure.

In the first article of the eleventh question he

treats of enjoyment or fruition, which is an act of th.e will.
These passages, however, deal with ploasure in an ethioal oontext,
and do not tal-ce up expressly the

natUl~e

and causes of pleasure.

The second important treatment of pleasure in the Prima Seoun..

.9.!:! bears direotly on the work of this thesis.

It is found in

questions 31 to 34 and occurs in a treatment of the passions of
the soul.

After speaking of the passions in genera.l, St. Thomas

takes up eaoh of the paSSions in partioular.
concupiscible part are dealt with first.

The passions of the

Love, hatred, desire,

pleasure and sadness are considered in that order.
The tour questions on pleasure methodically consider the

I

L
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natul~e

01: pleasure, its oauses, effeots, and goodness or evil.

The dootrine is presented largely from a metaphysioal standpoint
and with a firmness and olarity belonging to Thomas1s later works.
In the first artiole of the question dealing with the nature
of pleasure Thomas asks whether pleasure is a passion.
is in the at.firmative.

The answer

The basio reason why pleasure is said to

be a passion is that it is a movement of the sense appetite following upon sense apprehension. l

This is somewhat surprising,

-

sinoe Thomas has always spoken previously 01: pleasure as the termination of appetitive movement, and for this reason has hesitated
to oa11 it' a passion in the striot sonse.

The explanation of the

change oan be found in the reply to the seoond objection, where
two movements of the appetite are distinguished, one of desire for
a good, the other of pleasure in this good once it has been aoquired.

The prior movement of desire also oauses an exterior move-

ment toward possession in the order of exeoution.

This passage

must be quoted in full.
Ad seoundum dioendum quod in animaii duplex motus
oonsiderari potest: unus scOUndUi?l intentionem. finis, qui
pertinet ad appetitum, alius secundum exeoutionem, qui
pertinet ad exteriorom oporationem. Lieat ergo in eo
qui ja~'!l oonseoutus est bonwn in quo dalectatur, oesset
motus exeoutionis, quo tenditur in finem; non taman
oessat motus appetitivae partia, quae, stout prIus de-

lRespondeo dicendum quod motus appatitus sensltlvl propria
passio notninatur. • • • Aff'eotio autem quaecurnque ex apprehensione
sensitiva procedens, est motus appetltus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est oompetere deleotation!. • •• SIc ergo patet quod, cum
deleotatI0 sit luotus in appotitu animali cOrlsequens apprehensionem
sensus, deleotatio est passio animas. ~. 1., I-II, 31, 10.

Ii

I

'
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siderabat non habitum, ita postea deleotatur in habito.
Lioet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesantia boni daleotantis, quod appetitul
satisfaci t; tamen adhuc rem.anet i.mmutatio appetl tus ab
appetihili, ratione oujus delectatio !notus quidam est. 2
~ere

for the first time pleasure Is said to be a rcal movement of

the appetite and therefore a passion in the strict sense.

The

reason Is that Thomas here reoognizes a movement of the appetite
after it has gained possession of a desired good.

It is true that

the first appetitive movement of desire has ceased, and that the
~xternal

operation toward possession has come to an end, but the

iappetite still oontinues to be moved to pleasure by the suitable
~ood

still present and now in its possession.
More information about this newly mentioned movement of the

~ppetite
~uoh.

is certainly desirable, but St. Thomas does not provide

Only two instanoes oan be oited.

The first oooursin a dis-

iOussion of one of the effects of pleasure called dilatatio.

Admit-

~ing

that this effect can be prodicated only metaphorioally of the

~oul,

Thomas asserts that it oan be applied to operations of both

Ithe apprehensive and appetitive powers.

In tho case of the appeti-

2Ibid., 31, 1 ad 2. Of interest and importance here also is
itho commentary of Cajetan, who says thu.t pleasure f'ormally conIsists in the m.ovement of the appetite. "In primo articulo quaasit10nis trigosimaepr1rnae, eol11£6 requisita ad delectationem. Et
~lde quinque exigi: subjectum, objectum, at tres actus; scilicet
conjunctionis sorum, .. • • quam sicnlflcat ly constitutio; oognitionis tam objecti quam conjunctionis, at hanc slsnItlcat ly sensibilis; et imrllutationis appetitus, quae est formalis delectatl0,
at hanc significat ly motus anim!. Objectum exigit connaturalitatem: quam significat 1y naturam existentem. Conjunctio vero
~xigit slmultatem: quam sIgnn'icat ly ~ simul."
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tive poweps, Thomas speaks desoriptive1y, as follows.

"A1iud

8.utem est ex parte appetit1vae virtutis, quae assentit rei deleotab11i, et in aa quieseit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam interius capiendam..

Et sic dilatatur aff'eotus hominis per deleotatio-

nem, quasi se tradens ad continendunl interius rem dalectantem."3
The movement of the appetite is here described as an enlargement,
an attempt to reach out and take wi thin itself the good wi th which

it is in contact.
The seoond description of this movement of the appetite

00-

our's in di soussing whether pleasure oauses desire for i taolf.4

In

the eourse of the disoussion Thomas mentions that a good ppcsent to

a being may be possessed only imperfeotly by that being.

Ibe due, i'lrst, to the nature of the good object.

This may

If it oan be pos-

sessed and enjoyed only gradually, like a seven course dinner, for
instanoe, it will simultaneously arouse pleasure and desire.

A man

sitting down to such a dinner will be deli[hted by the appetiZer,
but "dum • • • delectatur in eo quod habet, desiderat potiri eo
quod restat."

Thomas remarks that almost all bodily pleasuzoes

cause desire for themselves in this way ..
On the part of the being which is in contaot with a pleaSing
object, this being may be incapable of enjoying that object all at
once, even

t~lour,h

it is present and attainable.

The pleasure

aroused by partial or imperfect possession of the objeot stirs up

--

3S.T., I-II, 33, 1 c.
4Tbid

2 c

"
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desire for perfect possession.
Now it mi2::ht be argued that the desire for further enjoyment
aroused by the first pleasurable oontaot with a suitable objeot is
that immutatl0, appetitus whioh Thomas has made the formal oomponent of pleasure.

But a better explanation would seem to be this:

the "rest in possession" is a vital thing, a kind of nervous exoitement, one mlght say, not a passive state or a kind of inertia.

the movement of an appetite

It does involve desire for more, but that desire is not what the
pleasure!.!.

Rather, pleasure is

in

possession of a suitable good, the movement being oaused by the
continued presence of the good.5
Now that it has been definitely established that pleasure is
a movement of the appetite, the question arises whether or not
!pleasure is in time.

Thomas's answer Is quite similar to the one

he gave in the sentences, holding that pleasure is only aocidentally in tlme.

The reason is that pleasure has as its objeot a

good already possessed, and this is as it were the end of appetitive movement.

But if the aoquired good underGoes change, the

pleasure in it will be accidentally in time, for tho pleasure will
change in a way corresponding to the change in its object. 6
st. Thomas next olarifles a point that has been troublesome,

SLicet enlm delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata presentia boni deleotantis, quod appetltui satisfacit; tamen
adhuc remanet imm.utatio appetitus ab appetibill, ratione cujus delectatio motus quidam est. Ibid., 31, 1, ad 2. See also 33, 2 ad 1.

6 Ibid., 31, 2 c and ad 3.

-
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namely, the distinotion between pleasure and joy.

He begins by

saying that joy is a speoies of pleasure, but asserts that this
term is used only to denote pleasure or the rational appetite.

He

further observes that, in the case of rational beings, whatever
af"fords them pleasure may also afford them joy.

However, he makes

olear by repeated assertion that joy follows only upon intellectual
apprehension of a suitable good. 7 The following passage oontains
a good

su~nary

of the dootrine.

[D]eleotatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis.
Ad apprehenslonem autem rationis, non solum oornmovetur
appetitus sensitlvus, per applicationem ad aliquid particularej sed etiwm appetitus intellectivus, qui dloitur
voluntas. E't seoundum hoo, in appetitu intellectivo, sive
in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudlum, non
autem deleotatio oorpol'alis.
Hoo autem interest inter deleotatlonem utriusque
appet1tus, quod deleotat10 ~ppetitus sensibilis est cum
aliqua trwlsmutatione corporali; delectatio auto. appet1tus Intellectlvi n1hil aliud est quam simplex motus
voluntatis. 8
Before leaving the distinotion between pleasure and joy, it
must be noted that joy is a passion only in the wide sense, for
it does not involve any bodily movement or change. 9

This is di-

rectly opposed to the notion of joy in the Q! Verltate, where it
was held to be one of the four principal passions.

However, joy

was not there restricted to pleasure of the intellectual appetite.
7Ib1d., 3 c and ad 1. See also q. 35, 2 c, where there is a
olear explanation of the terms interior anprehensi.o and extel"ior
a12prehensio.

8~ •• 31,

-
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prin.

9Ibid., ad fin. and ad 2.

The oause of pleasure is the next point disoussed by st.
Thomas.

The first article of question 32 discusses whether opera-

tion is the proper cause of pleasure.
reads as follows.
~uo

The body of the article

"Respondeo dicendum quod • • • ad delectationem

requiruntur: scilioet consecutio boni convenientis, at cognitio

~ujusmodi

adeptionis.

utr~mque

autem horum in quadam operations

consistit: nam actualis cognitl0 operatio quaedam est; similiter
~onum

conveniens adipiscimur aliqua oporatlono.

propria est quoddam conveniens.

Ipsa enim operatio

Unde oportet quod omnis delectatio

~liquam operationem consequatur. nlO

It is to be noted that St. Thomas here specifies two opera":'
tions that are required for pleasure.
~nite

One of these operations must

a cognitive being with a good suitable for it, and the other

ioperation must give the being knowledge that it is actually in possession of this suitable good.

p.y

In this passage Thomas mentions on-

in passing a point he lnade much of in the commentarl 2!! the

~entences.

This is that the very oporation which unites a cognitive

being with an objeot is itself a suitable good and therefore a
cause of pleasure.

In the Sentences it was even stated that the

-

unimpeded operation of a habit conformable to nature was the proper
formal cause of pleasure. ll

The reason given was that these unim-

peded operations specify pleasures to be of one kind rather than

lOIbid., 32, 1 c.
lIla IV ~.,

49,

3, 2 c.

another.

Similar doctrine is contained in the reply to the first

objection in the article from the SU.rllIna
...
.. now under discussion.
~eply

This

brings out more clearly than the body of the article that

tpleasure does not mel"ely follow tho operation but is oaused by it.
Ad prlmum ergo dicendum quod ipsa objeota operationum
non sunt deloctabllia, nisi inquantum conjIDlguntur nobis:
vel per cognitionom solam, sicut oum deleotwnur in oonsideratione vel inspectione aliquoruffij vel quocumque alio
modo simul cum oognitione, siout cum aliquis dolectatur
in hoc quod c08no8cit se habere quodcll.l11quo bonum, puta
divitias vel honorem, vel aliquid hujusmodl; quae quidem
non essent deloctabilia, nisi Inquantum approhenduntur
ut habita. • •• Habere autem hujusmodi nihil est aliud
quam uti €lis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per al iquam
operationem. Unde manifestum est quod omnia delectatl0
in operationom reducitur sicut in causam. 12
IEvery pleasure, therefore, can be reduced to .ro me oper'ation as its
cause, fOl'" suitable goods come to be possessed by a being only
through the mediation of sorne operation.

The operation itself is

the proximate cause of pleasure; the good which is the object of
the operation is the remote cause. 1 3
What kind of causal ity does the operation exercise, formal
or e.fficient?

It was recently notod that Thomas spoke of the ope-

ration as the formal cause of pleasu.re in tho Sentences, though he
by no means excluded it from exercising efficient causality.

in the

SUnl"JB.

Hera

we read: tI[C]ontlnglt quod duo sibi inviceru aunt

l2.§..!., I-II, 32, 1 ad 1.
l30f course, the operation must be natural and in due proportion. "Oparationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportionatae at oonnaturalos oper~~ti.n l2!£., ad 3. For the parallel
dootrine in the Sentences see In IV Sent., 49, 3, 2 C J which is
disoussed on pp. 36-38 of thlsthesiS;-
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causa, ita quod unum sit oausa offioiens, et aliud oausa finalls
alter:lus.

Et

pOl'

huno modum, operatio oausat delootatlonem siout

oausa offioions; deleotatio autem pertici t opol"ationem
finis. "ll~

pOZ'

modum

Here is a olear statement that the operation is an effi-

ciont cause of ploasure.

The reason is that a cognitive being can

possess a suitable good only
formable to its nature.

tl~ough

some unimpeded operation con-

When the good has been acquired, pleasure

follows upon the operation as a natural effeot, oompletinG and perfectIng it.

The operation is also a formal oause of pleasure, for

it specifies the pleasure to be of one kind rather than another.
The operation, of oourse, is speoified by its objeot, some suitable
good.

Thus it seems oorreot to say that the operation and its ob-

jeot are as one oomposite good whioh both oauses and specifies the
resultant p10asure.
It seems olear to the writer that St. Thomas has finally
solved a major problem here in question 32 of the

Prill!e: Secill1;daE!..

That problem is one ot: reoonoiling the traditional soholastic and
~hristlan

de1"inition of pleasure as "quietatio appetitus in bono"

or "quies in bono adepto" and Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure as
an operation or an after-effeot of an operation.
More precisely, there are two perspeotives of pleasure whioh
~homa8

has succeeded in fitting together.

called the Christian-Platonio.

The first might be

An objective good, something ex-

14s•T., I-II, 3), 4 ad Z. FO~ almost identioal dootrine see
1!: IV sent., 49, 3, 4, sol • .3 0, wr.doh ia quoted on p. 38.
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trinsic (specifically, God) is acquired, and this acquisition results in pleasure.

The second is Aristotle's position, which says

that natures are for operations.

When a being of a certain nature

erforms its proper operation easily and without hindrance, pleasure follows.

In this view the objective good practically becomes

a matter of indifference.
St. Thomas manages to link these two positions very nicely.
The perspective he takes can be seen here in questions 32 and 33,
here the operation is soen as linking the person .!!!S!.

h!! good,

and then the operation itself is seen as a good of the person.
Aristotle would have said only the latter.

By this priority St.

Thomas keeps himself in the Christian context.

It seems clear

that the Aristotelian influence on St. Thomas is not as great here
in the Sumraa as it was in the Sentences.
As one observes the variations and

chan[~es

in St. Thomas t s

discussion of pleasure, "hat seems to have happened is this: the
Christian-Platonic inher! tance \vhich St. Thomas received was gradually shifted to an Aristotelian theol'1Y, but in such a way that the
old was preserved in the new.

It would be necessary to know more

about the theories current at the time st. Thomas bagan writing,
and also to be able to deterrrlne more accurately whether in interpreting Aristotle as he did Thomas thoue.,ht he was being literally
faithful to the Stagyrite.

However, the end result is a theory

which preserves the Christian-Platonic philosophy of pleasure as
rest in the possession of a. good (God), and yet makes use of the

1
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~ristotelian

after-effeot or "overflow" of a good activity (know-

P.edge) •
Brief consideration must now be given to the effects of pleasActually, only one effect of pleasure remains to be

~e.

~or

two other effects were dealt with in treatinG the nature of

~leasure.

~or

discusse~

These two were dilatatio and pleasure's causing desire
In words very similar to those he used in the ~ommen

itself.

rtary 2!!

~

; ; ; E..; ;,t; .; h.; :;.i.; ;,c.; ;.s, Thomas says that pleasure perfects the opera-

tion which is its cause.
[D]electatio duplicitor operationem parfioit. Uno modo,
per modum finis; non quidem secundum quod finis dicltur
id propter quod aliquod est; sed secundum quod Ollme bonum
completive supervenlens potest dici finis. • • , inquantum
scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit
aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. ----Secundo modo,
ex parte causae agentis. Non quidem dirocte. • •• Indirecte autem: inquantum scilicet a[:;ens, quia delectatur
in sua actione, vehemeotius attondit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur. 15
The doctrine here is so similar to the Ethics, that it requires no
comraont.
One final point will conclude the presentation of the doctrine
on pleasure as found in the Summa.
~

In the chapters on the

.~ente~...

and the De Veri tate mention was made of a kind of pre-deleota-

tion.

-

This term was used to denote the first movemont of the ap-

lPotite by a suitable good before the good was actua.lly acquired.
For this reason it was also called a "movement-toward-possession."
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!Here in the StL.'lllna this notion of pre-deleotation is more fully de~eloped.

In discussing whether motion can be the cause of pleas-

rura" Thomas remarks: "[I]d quod movetur, etsi nondum habeat porit'eote id ad quod movetul--, inoiplt taman jam aliquid habere ejus ad
quod movetur: at secundum hoc, ipse notus habet aliquid deleotationis. n16

By the expression "habet aliquid delectationis," Thomas

soems to denote a sort of inoipient or pre-delectation.
With this the salient points of the doctrine on pleasure in
the

~umma

Theologiae have b0en presented.

The next and final

ohapter will sUlnmal'>ize the work of the thosis.

16 Ibid ., 32, 2, ad 1.

-

CHAPTER VI I
CONCLUSION

In reviewing St. Thomas's discussion and tl"eatrl0ut of pleaso in the four works under exal'11ina tion, it seems cloar that in

the discussion focuses around the f'ollmvlng questions:

1) Is pleasure a "z:eJ2ose in a good acquired" or is it a "natuunimpeded ac,tivitZ"?

In other words, is pleasure a state or a

If' pleasure partakes of' both, how does Thomas reconcile
two?
2) If pleasure is an activity or move.tlent, in what sense is

true?

Is pleasure identical with the operation which produces
rather an oEigino}'l1onon, an after-effect, which is con-

sequent upon the operation?

3) If pleasure is an af'ter-off'oct of' an operation, is this
Iso a kind of activity or movement?

4)
ot?

Is pleasure a passion'?

That is, is it a real movement or

(Obviously, this will dopend on the ansvver to the third ques-

ionl.

5)

If pleasure is a movelllent, what kind of movemont is it?

6) Does pleasure belong to appetite or to cog,nltion?
7) Vihat is the relation betweon appetite, cognition, and
odily change in pleasure?
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8) vYhat is the differenoe between pleasure and joy?

Is there

any relation between them?

The preceding chapters have prepared the way for answering
these questions.

By recalling points made in these ohapters and

synthesizing them, the answers to these eight questions should oome
clear.
The first question: Is pleasure a state or a movement?

Right

tl"om the first in the Sentenoes it was noted that Thomas was work-

ing with two views of pleasure: the Christian-Platonio "repose in
a good acquired" and the Aristotelian lfnatural unimpeded aotivity.lf
It 1s diffioult to say how consoious St. Thomas was that Aristotle
was working without the oontext of the objeotive good, and almost
exolusively 1n an operational oontext.

However, the Al"istotellan

influenoe is quite noticeable from the frequent quotations made
from the IHcomachean Ethios.
In the Sentence!, Thomas stresses that pleasure is the termination of appetitive movement, that is, it is the end of movement
to acquire the desired good.
state.

This would seem to make pleasure

8.

However, Thomas is quiok to add that lfin the termination of

the appetitive movement, a oertain movement arises in which the
psyohical paSSion oonsists."
"certain movement."l

He elaborates very little on this

But further on he notes that there is a pleas

ure whioh follows upon the posseSSion of a good, and that this

1pp. 31-32 and footnote 8.
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leasure is oaused by the operation which unites the being with its
ood objeot.

In brier, the Sentenoes does not settle the question,

ut both the Christian and Aristotelian influences are pl"esent.
In the !2! Ver'itate, pleasure, at least bodlly pleasure, is
said to consist in apprehension, but there is very little discusabout whether pleasure is a state or a movement.
In the Commentapy .2!.!

~

Ethics the doctrine presentod is

consi stont wi th that of the

~entence.~:

knowledge or a Bood

rise to appetitive movement toward that good; when the appeite rinds rest in the possession of the good, pleasure results.
here is this differenoe, however: in the E;thics, pleasure is
learly in the ordor of rinality, being the crowing perfection of
unimpeded operation.
ion 1s vague.

Still, the nature or this orowning perfec-

Is it a state of rest, a fUl"thel" movement of the

ppetite, or something else?
The Summa Theolohiae provides the definite answer.

There it

clear that pleasure is a movement or activity, not a state.
homas distinguishes two movements of the appetite, one of desire
or a good, the other of pleasure in this good onoe it has been aoThe prior movement at: desire also oauses movement toward
ossession in the order of exeoution.

When the good object has

een acquired desire ceases and the external opel"ation toward posession comes to an end, but the appetite still oontinues to be
the good object still present and now in its possession.
as suoh is the movement or a.ctivity of tho appetite caused
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by the possession of a suitablo good.

Thus it can be seen how

Thomas reconciles the Christian and Aristotelian views: pleasure
involves both the termination

(9.uie"~)

of desire and movement toward

possession, and the activity (fyepytlCt) of the appetite in possession of a suitable good.
The second question: If pleasure is an activity or movement,
Is it identical with the operation which produces it, or is it
rather an epiginoll!enon, an after-effect, whioh is consequent upon
the opera.tion?
The answor to this question is quite oonsistent in the four
works under examination.
!tions.

Pleasure is ca.used by unhampered opera-

Unhampol""ed operations of habits cOnfOI'l'llable to nature are

pel"rected or crowned by pleasure.

Pleasure is the crowning per-

fection of an unhmnpered operation. 2
The reason for this is not far to seek.

Every suitable good

whioh attracts oan be acquired and satisfy the appetite only
tl1rough the mediation of some operation.

If this operation is

natural and unhampered, pleasure results, crowning or perfecting
the operation.
The third question: If pleasure is an after-effect of an operation, is this also a kind of activity or movement?
in the affirmative.

The answer is

The operation puts the being in possession of

a suitable good, which satisfies one or more of its appetites.

2pp • 38 and

75-76.

The
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presence of this good causes a continued movement of the appetite.
This m.ovement is what is meant by an episinomenon or after-effect. 3
The fourth question: Is pleasure a passion?
real movement of the appetite or not?

The

anSWOl"

That is, is it a
to the question

is in the affirmative, but certainly it is given with more emphasis
and assurance in the later works.
In the Sentenoes Thomas hesitates to call pleasure a paSSion
because of h1s emphasis on the termination of appetitive movement
in speaking of pleasure.
of motion.

It thus seems to lack the essential note

But because pleasure always seems to involve some

bodily change or movement, Tho1:nas says "est in quadam passiono consistens."
In the Q! Veri tate Thomas deals mainly with joy, giving little
notice to pleasure.

However, he says in effect that pleasure is

pot a passion beoause it belongs to the apprehensive part of the
soul, not to the appetitive.
In the

~thios

Thomas olearly nmnbers pleasure among the pas-

sions of the appetitive part of the soul.

But again there is the

reservation that pleasure involves the termination of appetitive
movement and is something consequent upon this termination.

.

In the Summa there is no doubt about Thomas's position.
.
Pleasure is a passion in the strict sense, for it is a real movemont of the sense appetite oaused by tho possession of a suitable

3pp• 38, 86-87.
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good.4
sives

This final position that pleasure is always a movement
Q

basis for explaining the fluctuating intensity of pleasure.

This basis was hardly present in the earlier position, if present
at all.
An interesting sidelip;ht on the development of this doctrIne
is provided by Jean Langlois, S.J.

He says that the speoifio dif-

ference between pleasure and the othor paSSions is the notion of
Iqulos, repose, satisfaction of" the appeti to in the possession or
r..'

real presence of a suitable good.;>
~ith

Thom.as had to reoonci1e this

the notion of movement, Which 1s an essential note of passion

in the striot sense.
The fifth question: If pleasure is a movement, what leind of
movement is it?

As has been stated, pleasure is a movement of the

sense appetite in possession of a suitable good.
Thomas's mature doctrine in the Summa.

But this is

In the Sentenoes Thomas

seems to place a good deal of stress on the bodily chanGes that
usually aooompany pleasure.

In fact, 't;hese acoom.panying ohane;es

are the reason why he oal1s pleasure a paSSion, since

~leasure

is

said to oonsist in the termination of movement of the appetite
toward a suitable cood.
In the !2! Veri tate Thomas says tha.t pleasure be1onp;s to the
apprehensive powers, not to the appetItive.

"Pleasure of either

4p'. ~79.

S.T., I-II, 31, 1 ad 2.
5Jean Langlois, S.J., "La definition de 113. d61ectation," Lava+.

Theo1og1que

!E.

Philosophlque, V (1949), p. 177.
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kind begins with a real union and ends in ita apprehension.

~owever, bef,ins

Joy,

wi th apprehension and ends in the affections. tt6

trherefore it seems that plea.sure involves a change only in the
fapprehensive powers a.nd is not strictly

8.

passion.

In the Ethics Thomas says that pleasure follows upon all movo~ents of the appetitive part of the soul. 7

The reason is that all

ithese passions involve movement of the appetites in regard to good
evil, and the attainment of the good desired or the incurring

~nd

pf the evil is the cause of pleasure or sadness.

But just what the

!exact nature of pleasure is, what kind of movement it is, Thomas
does not clearly state.
In the Summa, however, it is perfectly clear that pleasure is

a movement of the sense appetites caused by the actual possession
pr real presence of some suitable good.

Desire and movement in the

prder of exeoution have been terminated, but tile continued presence
pf the object causes continued movement or the appetite.
The sixth question: Doea pleasure lie in the appetite or in
pognltion?
~eritate

~n

.!2!

states that pleasure lies in oognition, being terminated

the act of' apprehension.

~hat

~n

Of' the four works studied in this thesis, only the

But even in this \vorl< Thomas sta.tes

sense apprehensIon always involves some oorrespondin.g movement

the sonse appetite.

6~ruth, 26,
7pp • 70-71.

4 ad 5.

Two different reoonciliations of the doo-

,

\

-

.

trine of De Verltate with the other three mrks were presented in
:Jhapter IV.
~here

Certainly the author does not agree with Langlois that

is no possible reoonciliation between the doctrine of the

~hird book of the Sent~~ces and the Q! ~V~e_r_i_t_a_t_e.8
The other three
pften the

Q~ampered

W)

rks uniformly state that cognition is most

operation which is the formal cause of pleas-

ure, but the pleasure itself is in the appetitive part of the soul.
All .four

\\t)

rits clearly state that without cognition there oan be no

pleasure, but both tho

~thics

and the Summa ole£u"ly distinguish

between the cognitive operation whioh causes pleasure and the perfeotion of pleasure whiol1 orowns that cognitive

op~ration

"sicut

quaedam superveniens finis."9
The seventh question:

~Vhat

is the relation between appetite,

cognition, 81d bodily change in pleasure?

From what has been said,

ithe answer to this question must be evident.

To put it in techni-

cal language, appetite is the subject of pleasure, cognition is the
~ormal

cause and bodily change is the material cause.

is the formal cauae, for in addition to making a beine

Cognition
a~are

of a

good suitable for itself, it specifies the resultant pleasure to

be of one kind rather than another.
The
and joy?

e1~lth

question: \Vhat is the dIfference between pleasure

Is there any relation between them?

There is a notable

8Jean Langlois, S.J., "La definition de la delectation," p.
182.

See also pp. LtC> and

9pp. 75-76 and 51+-85.
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of this thesis.

97
growth and development of the Thomistic doctrine on this point.
In the Sentences, Thomas distinGuishes between pleasure and
joy on the basis of real contact and presence.

For example, if a

an actually eats a good meal, he experienoes pleasure.

If he only

anticipates this good meal or J'emernbers it, or pOSSibly, also reflects on it while eating it, he experiences joy.

In other words,

the distinction is between real or physical possession and intentional possession.

This is not the srune as the distinction between

sensible and rational.
In the

~ verita~e,

the distinction between pleasure and joy

seems based on the order of reciprocity.

That is, if the pleasant

experienoe begins in the oorporeal or appetitive order and ends in
the apprehensive, pleasure results.
lays over my perspiring body.

For example, a oooling breeze

When I beoome aware of this in my

mind, I experienoe pleasure.
However, joy is front the reflexive knowledge of the possession
of a pleasurable good.

If one reflects on the goodness of e>"1'eri-

onoing a oooling breeze, this kn,owlodt::e eives joy.
In both the

N~c.omachean

Ethics and the Surnl11a Theologi!.! the

doctrine on this point is uniform.

Suitable tUlilnpedod activity on

the sense or physical level gives rise to pleasure; on the rational
level it oauses joy_

In tlH3se two wor'ks the basis of the distinc-

tions is the kind of oognitive and appetitive activity involved in
the pleasant experienoe.

In brief, pleasure belongs to the sense

appetites, joy belonGS to the rational appetite or will.

I

I
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The four pl'>imary so;}rces of this study span approximately
Ififteen years in the life of St. Thomas.
last of them especially

thel~e

Between the first and

is noticeable a growth in olal"'ity,

IPrecision, and firr.moss of doctrine.

Although Thomas certainly

knew of the !!!.comachaan Ethios when he wrote his Com::nentarx .£!! the
Sentences, the use he thero makes of the Aristotelian doctrine does
not compare with the way he incorporates it into his own in the
Summa.

In the Sentences he uses many more words, but the doctrine

lacks the clarity and force it has in the St.Uru:la.

An example is the

distinction between pleasure and joy that has just been considered.
r.rhomas dwells on this point at some length in three diffcu'Emt
places in the
tion.

Sent~nces,

but tails to present a clear-cut distinc-

.

Yet in the Summa that result is achieved in the space of two

short articles .. lO

This study has witnessed not only the growth of

doctrine but also the growth of the philosopher.

10.2,.1_, I-II, 31, 1 and 2.
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